11j@1.1.3

the analysis identified unambiguous malicious behavior in log.js (the package main): an IIFE executes on require/import that monkey-patches console.log/warn/error to exfiltrate their first argument to a hardcoded Telegram bot endpoint with attacker-owned chat IDs and additionally PATCHes warn-intercepted data into an attacker-controlled Firebase RTDB. The module is further disguised with a large decoy DataTables employee dataset and a commented-out module.exports so require() returns {} while still installing the global console hooks. The combination of (a) load-time global side-effects, (b) two independent attacker-controlled exfiltration channels with hardcoded credentials/IDs, and (c) deliberate concealment via decoy data and suppressed exports constitutes a clear credential/data theft supply-chain attack with no plausible legitimate purpose. Package metadata ('11j', no description) provides no legitimate justification.