---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/9remote/v/3.0.12"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/9remote/v/3.0.12.md"
package: "9remote"
report_status: "published"
title: "9remote@3.0.12 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "3.0.12"
---

# 9remote@3.0.12 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 3.0.12
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The package's own server startup, with MCP registration defaulting on, rewrites foreign agent configs and installs status hooks for detected agents. That is guarded first-party agent setup aimed at a local endpoint, so it warrants a warning rather than a publish block.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 78.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-28T00:27:38.862Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-28T00:29:30.276Z
- **Download time:** 760 ms
- **Static scan time:** 10933 ms
- **AI review time:** 99720 ms
- **Total time:** 111414 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Launching the 9remote server registers its local MCP endpoint in many third-party coding-agent config files by default and installs status hooks for agents already present on the machine.

- **Trigger:** User launch of the 9remote server or daemon.

- **Impact:** Claude, Cursor, Codex, Copilot, Grok, and similar tools receive a localhost 9remote MCP server and status hooks as part of first-party startup, using a token generated on the machine.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/server.cjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-28T00:29:30.276Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** lle() enables MCP client entries under the user home directory when the saved artifact preference is unset. ble() writes hook or plugin files for detected agents that call back to the local server.

- **Rationale:** The package's own server startup, with MCP registration defaulting on, rewrites foreign agent configs and installs status hooks for detected agents. That is guarded first-party agent setup aimed at a local endpoint, so it warrants a warning rather than a publish block.

- **Files touched:** .claude.json, .cursor/mcp.json, .cursor/hooks.json, .codex/config.toml, .grok/config.toml, .grok/hooks/9remote.json

- **Network endpoints:** 127.0.0.1

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 78.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** Daemon startup calls lle(), and artifact MCP registration defaults on when artifactEnabled is unset because DEFAULT\_ENABLED is true., That registration writes a localhost 9remote MCP entry, with a locally generated bearer token, into third-party agent configs such as .cursor/mcp.json, .copilot/mcp-config.json, Claude, Codex, and Grok home files., ble() runs at the same startup and enables status hooks for every detected installed agent, including .cursor/hooks.json and other vendor hook or plugin paths., The npm postinstall script only prepares a local systray runtime under the user home directory and does not perform these agent writes.

- **Evidence against:** Hook and plugin payloads only report session status to the local 9remote server when NINE\_REMOTE\_SESSION\_ID is set., Quota helpers send saved Claude, Codex, Kimi, and Grok CLI credentials to those services' own APIs., The hinted session reader lists local agent transcript directories for the remote workspace UI.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to 9remote@3.0.12.

- Review the evidence and your use of 9remote@3.0.12 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node dist/install.cjs || true
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node dist/install.cjs || true
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/ptyDaemon.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/ptyDaemon.cjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L3: var pe=Object.create;var W=Object.defineProperty;var fe=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var de=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var he=Object.getPrototypeOf,Se=Object.prototype.hasOwnPro...
L4: `;try{a.default.appendFileSync(A,s)}catch{}console.error(s.trim())}function le(){return process.env.CODESPACES==="true"?process.env.CODESPACE_VSCODE_FOLDER||"/workspaces":process.e...
```

### 5. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/server.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/server.cjs>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L88: `}function RT(t){try{return(0,E0.execFileSync)("systemctl",["--user",...t],{stdio:"ignore"}),!0}catch{return!1}}function pUe(){return nUe()?((0,yn.mkdirSync)(Ta.default.dirname(yr....
L89: `).filter(Boolean))if((0,b0.execSync)(`ps -o ppid= -p ${e}`,{encoding:"utf8"}).trim()==="1")try{process.kill(Number(e))}catch{}}catch{}}function OT(){if(es)return;let t=vUe[process...
L90:
```

### 6. Low: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 45.0%

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/ptyDaemon.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/ptyDaemon.cjs>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L3: var pe=Object.create;var W=Object.defineProperty;var fe=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var de=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var he=Object.getPrototypeOf,Se=Object.prototype.hasOwnPro...
```

### 8. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** dist/server.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/server.cjs>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L2: var xIe=Object.create;var Ux=Object.defineProperty;var bIe=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var TIe=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var AIe=Object.getPrototypeOf,CIe=Object.prototype.has...
L3: `:`
...
L5: `,i)}while(r!==-1);return s+=t.slice(i),s}var B8=ae(()=>{});function Pv(t){return FIe(t)}var q8,$8,W1,Um,kv,G8,Fm,UIe,FIe,V1,BIe,qIe,z1,qx,$Ie,GIe,hyt,Ov,K1=ae(()=>{O8();L8();B8();...
L6: `);return s!==-1&&(e=F8(e,i,r,s)),r+e+i};Object.defineProperties(Pv.prototype,Fm);GIe=Pv(),hyt=Pv({level:$8?$8.level:0}),Ov=GIe});async function Y8(){if(!(process.platform!=="darwi...
L7: `)}catch{}}function Hx(t){return t.map(e=>{if(e instanceof Error)return e.stack||e.message;if(typeof e=="object")try{return JSON.stringify(e)}cat
```

### 9. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 10. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 11. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/ptyDaemon.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/ptyDaemon.cjs>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L3: var pe=Object.create;var W=Object.defineProperty;var fe=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var de=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var he=Object.getPrototypeOf,Se=Object.prototype.hasOwnPro...
L4: `;try{a.default.appendFileSync(A,s)}catch{}console.error(s.trim())}function le(){return process.env.CODESPACES==="true"?process.env.CODESPACE_VSCODE_FOLDER||"/workspaces":process.e...
L5: `,n+=`[ -f "${o}/.zshrc" ] && source "${o}/.zshrc"
...
L8: `,a.default.writeFileSync(i,n),t.ZDOTDIR=c}else if(s){let i=t.PROMPT_COMMAND||"";t.PROMPT_COMMAND=`printf "\\e]7;file://%s\\a" "\${HOSTNAME}\${PWD}"${i?`; ${i}`:""}`}return/cmd\.ex...
L9: `;for(let r of z)try{r.write(t)}catch{}}function oe(e,t){try{e.write(JSON.stringify(t)+`
L10: `)}c
```

### 12. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 13. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/cli.cjs>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L3: var Wa=Object.create;var Br=Object.defineProperty;var ja=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Ga=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Va=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ya=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L4: `)[0].replace(/\=|\s+|\"/gi,"").toLowerCase();case"win32":return P.toString().split("REG_SZ")[1].replace(/\r+|\n+|\s+/gi,"").toLowerCase();case"linux":return P.toString().replace(/...
L5: Local: ${n}
```

### 14. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/cli.cjs>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L3: var Wa=Object.create;var Br=Object.defineProperty;var ja=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Ga=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Va=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ya=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L4: `)[0].replace(/\=|\s+|\"/gi,"").toLowerCase();case"win32":return P.toString().split("REG_SZ")[1].replace(/\r+|\n+|\s+/gi,"").toLowerCase();case"linux":return P.toString().replace(/...
L5: Local: ${n}
L6: Right-click to open / quit`}function Us(){let{port:e,tunnelUrl:t}=on,r=process.platform==="win32",o=t?`9Remote (Port ${e}) \u2022 Tunnel ON`:`9Remote (Port ${e}) \u2022 Local only`...
L7: `,"utf8")}catch{}};return Cs.default.createInterface({input:i.stdout}).on("line",c=>{try{let l=JSON.parse(c);if(l.type!=="click")return;l.ind
```

### 15. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/server.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/server.cjs>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/server.cjs:
`);return s!==-1&&(e=F8(e,i,r,s)),r+e+i};Object.defineProperties(Pv.prototype,Fm);GIe=Pv(),hyt=Pv({level:$8?$8.level:0}),Ov=GIe});async function Y8(){if(!(process.platform!=="darwi...
`).filter(Boolean).slice(-t)}catch{return[]}}function mK(){try{ya.default.writeFileSync(Dv,"")}catch{}}function xe(t){return{debug:(...e)=>{rM&&qm(t,"debug",Hx(e))},info:(...e)=>qm...
`);function a(c){var l=FM(Ol.join(c,"prebuilds")).map(G5),u=l.filter(H5(LM,DM)).sort(j5)[0];if(u){var d=Ol.join(c,"prebuilds",u.name),f=FM(d).map(W5),m=f.filter(V5(NM,N5)),g=m.sort...
`+r)}t.destroy()}var Vv=[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
```

### 16. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/server.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/server.cjs>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L17: `).join(`\r
L18: `)),s.removeListener("error",JY),u.setSocket(s,o,{allowSynchronousEvents:this.options.allowSynchronousEvents,maxPayload:this.options.maxPayload,sk[redacted]:this.options.skip...
L19: `+Object.keys(r).map(i=>`${i}: ${r[i]}`).join(`\r
...
L21: \r
L22: `+n)}function yp(t,e,n,r,i,s){if(t.listenerCount("wsClientError")){let o=new Error(i);Error.captureStackTrace(o,yp),t.emit("wsClientError",o,n,e)}else Wv(n,r,i,s)}});var n9=B((S_t,...
L23: Connection: close\r
...
L32: \r
L33: `+n)}function xp(t,e,n,r,i,s){if(t.listenerCount("wsClientError")){let o=new Error(i);Error.captureStackTrace(o,xp),t.emit("wsClientError",o,n,e)}else n0(n,r,i,s)}});var YX=B((avt,...
L34: `)){if(!a.includes(" Add "))continue;let c=a.match(MLe)?.[1];if(c&&c!=="127.0.0.1")return i(c)}}),n.on("error",()
```

### 17. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/server.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/server.cjs>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L2: var xIe=Object.create;var Ux=Object.defineProperty;var bIe=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var TIe=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var AIe=Object.getPrototypeOf,CIe=Object.prototype.has...
L3: `:`
...
L5: `,i)}while(r!==-1);return s+=t.slice(i),s}var B8=ae(()=>{});function Pv(t){return FIe(t)}var q8,$8,W1,Um,kv,G8,Fm,UIe,FIe,V1,BIe,qIe,z1,qx,$Ie,GIe,hyt,Ov,K1=ae(()=>{O8();L8();B8();...
L6: `);return s!==-1&&(e=F8(e,i,r,s)),r+e+i};Object.defineProperties(Pv.prototype,Fm);GIe=Pv(),hyt=Pv({level:$8?$8.level:0}),Ov=GIe});async function Y8(){if(!(process.platform!=="darwi...
L7: `)}catch{}}function Hx(t){return t.map(e=>{if(e instanceof Error)return e.stack||e.message;if(typeof e=="object")try{return JSON.stringify(e)}cat
```

### 18. High: Remote Agent Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/server.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/server.cjs>)

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: `)}catch{}}function Hx(t){return t.map(e=>{if(e instanceof Error)return e.stack||e.message;if(typeof e=="object")try{return JSON.stringify(e)}catch{return String(e)}return String(e...
L8: === SESSION ${new Date().toISOString()} pid=${process.pid} argv=${process.argv.slice(2).join(" ")} ===`),ske())}function pK(t){eM=t}function hK(t=60){try{return ya.default.readFile...
L9: `).filter(Boolean).slice(-t)}catch{return[]}}function mK(){try{ya.default.writeFileSync(Dv,"")}catch{}}function xe(t){return{debug:(...e)=>{rM&&qm(t,"debug",Hx(e))},info:(...e)=>qm...
...
L32: \r
L33: `+n)}function xp(t,e,n,r,i,s){if(t.listenerCount("wsClientError")){let o=new Error(i);Error.captureStackTrace(o,xp),t.emit("wsClientError",o,n,e)}else n0(n,r,i,s)}});var YX=B((avt,...
L34: `)){if(!a.includes(" Add "))co
```

### 19. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/cli.cjs>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.cjs
L2: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L3: var Wa=Object.create;var Br=Object.defineProperty;var ja=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Ga=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Va=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ya=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L4: `)[0].replace(/\=|\s+|\"/gi,"").toLowerCase();case"win32":return P.toString().split("REG_SZ")[1].replace(/\r+|\n+|\s+/gi,"").toLowerCase();case"linux":return P.toString().replace(/...
L5: Local: ${n}
L6: Right-click to open / quit`}function Us(){let{port:e,tunnelUrl:t}=on,r=process.platform==="win32",o=t?`9Remote (Port ${e}) \u2022 Tunnel ON`:`9Remote (Port ${e}) \u2022 Local only`...
L7: `,"utf8")}catch{}};return Cs.default.createInterface({input:i.stdout}).on("line",c=>{tr
```

### 20. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/cli.cjs>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.cjs
L2: const __importMetaUrl = require('url').pathToFileURL(__filename).href;
L3: var Wa=Object.create;var Br=Object.defineProperty;var ja=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Ga=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Va=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ya=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L4: `)[0].replace(/\=|\s+|\"/gi,"").toLowerCase();case"win32":return P.toString().split("REG_SZ")[1].replace(/\r+|\n+|\s+/gi,"").toLowerCase();case"linux":return P.toString().replace(/...
L5: Local: ${n}
L6: Right-click to open / quit`}function Us(){let{port:e,tunnelUrl:t}=on,r=process.platform==="win32",o=t?`9Remote (Port ${e}) \u2022 Tunnel ON`:`9Remote (Port ${e}) \u2022 Local only`...
L7: `,"utf8")}catch{}};return Cs.default.createInterface({input:i.s
```

### 21. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/server.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/server.cjs>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/server.cjs
L17: `).join(`\r
L18: `)),s.removeListener("error",JY),u.setSocket(s,o,{allowSynchronousEvents:this.options.allowSynchronousEvents,maxPayload:this.options.maxPayload,sk[redacted]:this.options.skip...
L19: `+Object.keys(r).map(i=>`${i}: ${r[i]}`).join(`\r
...
L21: \r
L22: `+n)}function yp(t,e,n,r,i,s){if(t.listenerCount("wsClientError")){let o=new Error(i);Error.captureStackTrace(o,yp),t.emit("wsClientError",o,n,e)}else Wv(n,r,i,s)}});var n9=B((S_t,...
L23: Connection: close\r
...
L32: \r
L33: `+n)}function xp(t,e,n,r,i,s){if(t.listenerCount("wsClientError")){let o=new Error(i);Error.captureStackTrace(o,xp),t.emit("wsClientError",o,n,e)}else n0(n,r,i,s)}});var YX=B((avt,...
L34: `)){if(!a.includes(" Add ")
```

### 22. High: Base64 Obscured Url
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/web/\_next/static/chunks/5018-0af0eec430de34c7.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/web/_next/static/chunks/5018-0af0eec430de34c7.js>)

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L81: `).slice(2,3).join(`
L82: `).trim(),t=/(file:|vscode-file:\/\/vscode-app)?(\/[^:]*:\d+:\d+)/.exec(e);T.register(s,t?.[2]??e,s)}return s},this._event}_removeListener(e){if(this._options?.onWillRemoveListener...
L83:
```

### 23. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 24. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 25. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 26. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/assets/tray.ps1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/assets/tray.ps1>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/assets/tray.ps1
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 4280
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 27. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1>)

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1
kind = compressed_blob
sizeBytes = 90640
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 28. High: Ships High Entropy Blob
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1>)

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1
kind = high_entropy_blob
sizeBytes = 90640
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 29. Low: Nested Archive Needs Inspection
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1>)

Package ships a nested archive or MCP bundle that was inventoried but not recursively analyzed.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/vendor/scrcpy-server-v3.1
kind = nested_archive_needs_inspection
sizeBytes = 90640
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 30. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 31. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/server.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/server.cjs>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 6
```

### 32. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/web/\_next/static/chunks/8439-43c6c0f6514a09d9.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/9remote@3.0.12/dist/web/_next/static/chunks/8439-43c6c0f6514a09d9.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = 9remote@3.0.27
matchedIdentity = npm:OXJlbW90ZQ:3.0.27
similarity = 0.858
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 20
- **Optional dependencies:** 4
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 9
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 24

### Published dependency entries
- @google/genai ^2.23.0 (Dependency)
- archiver ^5.3.2 (Dependency)
- bufferutil 4.1.0 (Dependency)
- chalk ^5.4.1 (Dependency)
- chokidar ^3.6.0 (Dependency)
- http-proxy ^1.18.1 (Dependency)
- https-proxy-agent ^7.0.0 (Dependency)
- inquirer ^9.3.8 (Dependency)
- koffi ^2.16.3 (Dependency)
- multicast-dns ^7.2.5 (Dependency)
- node-machine-id ^1.1.12 (Dependency)
- node-screenshots ^0.2.8 (Dependency)
- ora ^8.1.1 (Dependency)
- preact ^10.26.2 (Dependency)
- qrcode ^1.5.4 (Dependency)
- qrcode-terminal ^0.12.0 (Dependency)
- sharp 0.33.5 (Dependency)
- socket.io ^4.8.3 (Dependency)
- utf-8-validate 6.0.6 (Dependency)
- web-push ^3.6.7 (Dependency)
- @hurdlegroup/robotjs ^0.12.1 (OptionalDependency)
- @julusian/jpeg-turbo ^3.0.1 (OptionalDependency)
- node-datachannel 0.32.3 (OptionalDependency)
- node-pty 1.2.0-beta.12 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** 9remote
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 3.0.12
- **License:** BSL-1.1
- **Version published:** 2026-09-23T17:49:58.992Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-06T14:30:14.421Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-15T17:27:37.394Z
- **Known versions:** 47
- **Latest version:** 3.0.55
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Remote terminal access from anywhere
- **Maintainers:** decolua
- **Keywords:** remote, terminal, ssh, cli
- **Artifact files:** 607
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 16,129,752 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/9remote/v/3.0.12>)
