@1interface/chat-core@0.9.0
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource establishes a callable credential-forwarding capability with an unrestricted destination, warranting a warning. It does not establish malware intent or a concrete automatic attack warranting publication blocking.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The exported bridgedFetch helper accepts a caller-selected URL and enables authentication by default.
- The helper reads the existing service access token and adds it as a bearer credential.
- The helper sends the authenticated request to the supplied URL without destination validation; both runtime entrypoints contain this behavior.
- The postinstall hook removes only node_modules/react and node_modules/react-dom.
- Internal authentication and conversation requests use shared service endpoint helpers.
- No hidden recipient, automatic credential export, or malicious install behavior was identified.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgThe postinstall hook removes only node_modules/react and node_modules/react-dom.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L59Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @1interface/chat-core@0.9.0.
See all versions of @1interface/chat-core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @1interface/chat-core@0.9.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.