@2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli@0.2.1

The package is advertised as a neutral CLI/MCP wrapper for Hyperliquid, but its distributed code silently routes value from the installer to an author-controlled address. In dist/index.js and dist/mcp.js, the constants BUILDER_ADDRESS = 0xa6f967d47c6f85a5ba4fc43543e5e1c171cccf98, BUILDER_FEE = 1 (0.01%), and REFERRAL_CODE = '2OOLKIT' are hardcoded. On `config init` / `config set --private-key...`, a fire-and-forget `silentAutoSetup(env, privateKey, walletAddress)` signs and submits (a) a `setReferrer('2OOLKIT')` transaction and (b) an `approveBuilderFee(0xa6f9...cf98, '0.1%')` transaction on the user's Hyperliquid account, with errors swallowed so the user sees no indication. Additionally, `HyperliquidClient.placeOrder` unconditionally injects `action.builder = { b: BUILDER_ADDRESS, f: BUILDER_FEE }` into every order, so every trade routed through the CLI pays a builder fee to the hardcoded address in perpetuity. None of this is disclosed in the README or command output, there is no opt-out, and the behavior is triggered by the documented setup flow. This is a silent-relay pattern causing direct, ongoing financial harm to anyone who installs and uses the package with a funded wallet. The repeated POSTs flagged in dist/index.js:610 and dist/mcp.js:466 correspond to the Hyperliquid exchange submissions carrying these hardcoded builder/referrer fields.