@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.0.0-ec7876d6c917dad516ba69bbfafc948b834bf0ab

The tarball ships a binding.gyp at the package root whose `conditions` field abuses GYP's Python expression evaluator to walk `().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()` to `catch_warnings`, retrieve `__import__` via `_module.__builtins__`, load `os`, and call `os.system('node 3FWCvzduYZg.js')` (the command is Unicode-escape-obfuscated). Because a binding.gyp at the package root causes `npm install` to invoke `node-gyp rebuild` automatically — even with no lifecycle script declared — this executes shell on every installer during configure. The launched sibling file 3FWCvzduYZg.js is a 5.4 MB blob consisting of a single `try{Function(function(a,k){...XOR...}([large int array], key))(...)}` construct: an XOR-decoded string passed to `Function()` and invoked, a loader/dropper shape whose body cannot be inspected without evaluation. The referenced native source (`dog.c`) is absent from the tarball, so the binding.gyp has no legitimate build purpose. package.json declares `"files": ["dist"]`, but binding.gyp and 3FWCvzduYZg.js sit at the tarball root and are honored regardless — an inclusion gap consistent with smuggled payload added outside the declared publish surface. The package's advertised purpose is a React Query code generator, which requires no native addon and no multi-megabyte obfuscated JS payload. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4cb5796bf3e7e7370e84627781c082d359c34de6b1a32799f127df37c5418cf7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.