registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / @accio-ai/cli
@accio-ai/cli
Work Agent CLI - AI-native command line interface
This report shows the evidence for @accio-ai/cli@0.1.31. 3 of 21 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.1.63, is allowed. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a concrete postinstall persistence mechanism targeting multiple foreign/broad AI-agent instruction directories. The benign binary launcher does not mitigate this automatic control-surface write.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
npm postinstall
Impact
Future AI-agent sessions can load package-supplied instructions that prompt installation, upgrades, authentication, and use of `workctl`.
Mechanism
Extracts bundled agent instructions and force-copies them into broad AI-agent control surfaces
Policy narrative
On npm postinstall, `install.js` unpacks a bundled skill archive and force-copies its contents into four home-directory AI-agent skill locations, including third-party agent surfaces such as Claude, Cursor, and Codex. These skills are then available for automatic discovery in later agent sessions and instruct agents to install, upgrade, authenticate, and use the package's CLI. This is an unconsented broad AI-agent control-surface mutation.
AI rationale
The package has a concrete postinstall persistence mechanism targeting multiple foreign/broad AI-agent instruction directories. The benign binary launcher does not mitigate this automatic control-surface write.
Evidence
package.jsoninstall.jsassets/workctl-skills.zipbin/workctl.js$HOME/.agents/skills/workctl$HOME/.claude/skills/workctl$HOME/.cursor/skills/workctl$HOME/.codex/skills/workctl$HOME/.workctl/cache
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 98.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- `install.js` runs automatically via `postinstall`.
- `install.js` extracts `assets/workctl-skills.zip` into four home-directory agent skill surfaces.
- It writes to `.agents/skills`, `.claude/skills`, `.cursor/skills`, and `.codex/skills` without user consent.
- It force-deletes and recreates `$HOME/.workctl/cache`.
- The archived skills direct AI agents to install/upgrade and authenticate this CLI.
Evidence against
- `bin/workctl.js` only resolves a platform package binary and forwards user CLI arguments.
- The launcher removes three runtime override variables before spawning the binary.
- Inspected JavaScript contains no credential harvesting or direct network client.
- The ZIP contains readable Markdown skill instructions, not an opaque executable payload.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node install.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node install.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgassets/workctl-skills.zipView file
•path = assets/workctl-skills.zip
kind = high_entropy_blob
sizeBytes = 36080
magicHex = [redacted]
High
Ships High Entropy Blob
Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.
assets/workctl-skills.zipView on unpkgFindings
3 High4 Medium4 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighShips High Entropy Blobassets/workctl-skills.zip
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturebin/workctl.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Compressed Blobassets/workctl-skills.zip
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowNested Archive Needs Inspectionassets/workctl-skills.zip
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @accio-ai/cli@0.1.31.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @accio-ai/cli@0.1.31. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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