@acedatacloud/nexior@3.324.30
⚠ Under review<div align="center">
AI Security Review
scanned 4mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged clipboard behavior is a user-clicked copy of the connected wallet public address, not address substitution. The package includes powerful but explicitly consent-gated Android automation features and no concrete malicious chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshotThe AI recommended clean, but the final policy action is warn. This report does not record a matching static-policy override reason.
- Android bundle exposes screenshot, UI, tap, type, and key tools.
- Wallet bundle supports signing and transaction submission.
- package.json has only prepare: husky; no install/postinstall hook.
- Mobile computer tools require an enabled local setting and foreground per-action consent.
- Clipboard code only copies the connected wallet's displayed public address on click.
- No source evidence of wallet-address replacement, credential harvesting, or exfiltration.
- Service worker only displays push notifications and opens a supplied deep link.
- No package-owned AI-agent config or foreign control-surface writes found.
Source & flagged code
2 flaggedSource reads and rewrites clipboard contents matching cryptocurrency wallet addresses.
dist/assets/solana-wallets-vue-DutFGlU3.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @acedatacloud/nexior@3.324.30.
See all versions of @acedatacloud/nexior for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @acedatacloud/nexior@3.324.30 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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