registry / @activepieces/piece-google-contacts / 0.5.1
@activepieces/piece-google-contacts@0.5.1
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe entrypoint contains an active, unconditional TLS-verification bypass on the authenticated request path. This is a concrete critical security weakness, but the inspected code does not establish malicious intent or a completed attack.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Running a Google Contacts action or trigger that sends an API request.
Impact
A network attacker able to intercept traffic could impersonate the intended service and observe or alter authenticated API traffic.
Mechanism
The request client sets the Node TLS rejection setting to disabled, then sends a bearer-token-authenticated request.
AI rationale
The entrypoint contains an active, unconditional TLS-verification bypass on the authenticated request path. This is a concrete critical security weakness, but the inspected code does not establish malicious intent or a completed attack.
Evidence
src/index.js
Network endpoints1
people.googleapis.com/v1/people
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 96.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The manifest loads src/index.js as the package entrypoint.
- The active HTTP client disables Node TLS certificate verification before sending requests.
- The Google Contacts request helper sends the OAuth bearer token through that HTTP client to the Google People API.
Evidence against
- No install or lifecycle hook is declared in the manifest.
- No concrete data-exfiltration recipient or command execution path was found in the inspected entrypoint behavior.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedsrc/index.jsView file
48${h}
L49: `+await t.crypto.sha256DigestHex(m),S=await KV(t.crypto,t.securityCredentials.secretAccessKey,s,t.region,o),E=await Ju(t.crypto,S,_),T=`${wN} Credential=${t.securityCredentials.acc...
L50: To learn more about authentication and Google APIs, visit:
High
37`+S+"}":"{"+E.join(",")+"}",o=S,h}}a(l,"str"),typeof O0.stringify!="function"&&(O0.stringify=function(p,f,y){var m;if(o="",n="",typeof y=="number")for(m=0;m<y;m+=1)n+=" ";else type...
L38: `,r:"\r",t:" "},i,s=a(function(S){throw{name:"SyntaxError",message:S,at:r,text:i}},"error"),u=a(function(S){return S&&S!==o&&s("Expected '"+S+"' instead of '"+o+"'"),o=i.charAt(r),...
L39: Supported algorithms are:
...
L48: ${h}
L49: `+await t.crypto.sha256DigestHex(m),S=await KV(t.crypto,t.securityCredentials.secretAccessKey,s,t.region,o),E=await Ju(t.crypto,S,_),T=`${wN} Credential=${t.securityCredentials.acc...
L50: To learn more about authentication and Google APIs, visit:
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
src/index.jsView on unpkg · L3737
Findings
6 High3 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processsrc/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executionsrc/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationsrc/index.js
HighCloud Metadata Accesssrc/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationsrc/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @activepieces/piece-google-contacts@0.5.1.
See all versions of @activepieces/piece-google-contacts for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @activepieces/piece-google-contacts@0.5.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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