registry / @activepieces/piece-google-contacts / 0.5.3
@activepieces/piece-google-contacts@0.5.3
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s cloud metadata and command execution signals are consistent with bundled Google authentication support. The exported custom API action has a separate, user-triggered TLS verification side effect that presents unresolved risk, so a warning is appropriate.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user invokes the generic API action to send a request.
Impact
TLS certificate checks may remain disabled for subsequent HTTPS requests in the process.
Mechanism
The shared request client sets Node’s TLS verification override before sending the action’s request.
AI rationale
The scanner’s cloud metadata and command execution signals are consistent with bundled Google authentication support. The exported custom API action has a separate, user-triggered TLS verification side effect that presents unresolved risk, so a warning is appropriate.
Evidence
src/index.jspackage.json
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The manifest points to src/index.js and declares no dependencies or lifecycle scripts.
- The generic API action accepts a URL from its input and sends the request through a shared client.
- That action is included in the exported Google Contacts actions.
- The request client changes Node’s TLS verification setting to disabled when sending a request.
Evidence against
- The TLS override is reached through a user-invoked API action; the source does not establish hidden credential transfer or an install-time attack.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedsrc/index.jsView file
48${h}
L49: `+await t.crypto.sha256DigestHex(m),P=await X2(t.crypto,t.securityCredentials.secretAccessKey,s,t.region,o),S=await Ju(t.crypto,P,_),T=`${I$} Credential=${t.securityCredentials.acc...
L50: To learn more about authentication and Google APIs, visit:
High
37`+P+"}":"{"+S.join(",")+"}",o=P,h}}a(l,"str"),typeof k0.stringify!="function"&&(k0.stringify=function(p,f,y){var m;if(o="",n="",typeof y=="number")for(m=0;m<y;m+=1)n+=" ";else type...
L38: `,r:"\r",t:" "},i,s=a(function(P){throw{name:"SyntaxError",message:P,at:r,text:i}},"error"),u=a(function(P){return P&&P!==o&&s("Expected '"+P+"' instead of '"+o+"'"),o=i.charAt(r),...
L39: Supported algorithms are:
...
L48: ${h}
L49: `+await t.crypto.sha256DigestHex(m),P=await X2(t.crypto,t.securityCredentials.secretAccessKey,s,t.region,o),S=await Ju(t.crypto,P,_),T=`${I$} Credential=${t.securityCredentials.acc...
L50: To learn more about authentication and Google APIs, visit:
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
src/index.jsView on unpkg · L3737
Findings
6 High3 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processsrc/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executionsrc/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationsrc/index.js
HighCloud Metadata Accesssrc/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationsrc/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @activepieces/piece-google-contacts@0.5.3.
See all versions of @activepieces/piece-google-contacts for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @activepieces/piece-google-contacts@0.5.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.