@addai/node@0.30.1
Daemon that pairs a machine with your +Ai account and runs Claude / Codex / Kimi / Gemini agents on its behalf. Reachable via Supabase from Vault, Entity Studio, or any other +Ai surface.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected source supports a warning for runtime AI-agent capability abuse and user-level persistence, but not a malware block. The postinstall hook is narrowly scoped and no covert exfiltration or install-time foreign AI-agent control-surface mutation was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Daemon startup changes Claude’s global setting to suppress the dangerous-mode permission prompt.
- A remotely dispatched command can enable login-start persistence through the package’s autostart backend.
- Codex runs receive copied or linked host authentication artifacts in a temporary runtime home.
- The install hook only repairs execute permission on node-pty’s own spawn helper.
- Persistence is exposed as an explicit CLI command and a named remote command, not an install-time action.
- No source evidence showed hidden exfiltration, destructive behavior, or a foreign control-surface write during installation.
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/command-runner.jsView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @addai/node@0.30.1.
See all versions of @addai/node for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @addai/node@0.30.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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