--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@addai/node/v/0.30.11" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@addai/node/v/0.30.11.md" package: "@addai/node" report_status: "published" title: "@addai/node@0.30.11 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.30.11" --- # @addai/node@0.30.11 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse - **Selected version:** 0.30.11 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package has a real dangerous agent-control capability that alters a foreign user-level Claude setting, but its lifecycle hook is limited and persistence requires an explicit command. This warrants a warning rather than a publication block. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-14T08:30:51.806Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-14T08:32:09.163Z - **Download time:** 506 ms - **Static scan time:** 2656 ms - **AI review time:** 74193 ms - **Total time:** 77357 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Running the ainode daemon silently changes Claude's user-level configuration to suppress its dangerous-mode confirmation. Once paired, the daemon also maintains an authenticated relay connection and can launch configured agent harnesses. - **Trigger:** A user runs the ainode daemon and pairs the machine. - **Impact:** A user can lose Claude's warning before dangerous-mode runs, increasing the risk of unattended agent actions. - **Evidence paths:** dist/claude-config.js, dist/index.js, dist/desktop/relay-client.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-14T08:32:09.163Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** User-wide Claude permission-prompt suppression plus authenticated remote agent orchestration. - **Rationale:** The package has a real dangerous agent-control capability that alters a foreign user-level Claude setting, but its lifecycle hook is limited and persistence requires an explicit command. This warrants a warning rather than a publication block. - **Files touched:** ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.claude.json, ~/.ainode/state.json - **Network endpoints:** desktop-relay-29522465016.europe-west2.run.app ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** Starting the daemon automatically sets Claude's user-wide bypass-permission acceptance., The daemon opens an authenticated relay connection using its pairing token in the WebSocket URL., The package launches external AI coding agents, including Claude with a dangerous permission-bypass flag when requested. - **Evidence against:** The only install hook loads a helper that repairs execute permission on node-pty's spawn helper; it does not reach the Claude configuration code., Startup persistence is exposed as the explicit \`ainode startup enable\` command., No runtime dependency on @addai/node, encoded payload, or install-time network activity was found. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @addai/node@0.30.11. - Review the evidence and your use of @addai/node@0.30.11 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/fix-pty-helper.js ``` ### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/claude-system-prompt.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L62: const crypto_1 = require("crypto"); L63: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L64: const win_1 = require("./win"); ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 6. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% - **Path:** dist/flows/engine-loader.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L21: exports.engineLoaded = engineLoaded; L22: const dynamicImport = new Function('specifier', 'return import(specifier);'); L23: let cached = null; ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/unpair.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L17: exports.disconnectNode = disconnectNode; L18: const supabase_client_1 = require("./supabase-client"); L19: const store_1 = require("./store"); ``` ### 8. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 9. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 10. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/autostart-win.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: // L14: // The task is registered from generated XML rather than `schtasks` flags, L15: // because the settings that decide whether it ever runs are not reachable ... L59: const path = __importStar(require("path")); L60: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L61: const autostart_1 = require("./autostart"); ... L71: * username is ambiguous on a machine joined to one. */ L72: function currentUserId(env = process.env) { L73: const user = env.USERNAME || os.userInfo().username; L74: const dom = env.USERDOMAIN; ... L81: * behaves, instead of being wedged into a VBS string or a `schtasks` argument. L82: * The redirect matters: headless stdout on Windows has nowhere else to go, and ``` ### 11. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 12. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/desktop/open-viewer.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L12: // browser viewer is the honest fallback. L13: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L14: /** What we would run, as a pure value, so the choice is testable without L15: * launching anything. */ L16: function viewerCommand(platform, t, studioBase = 'https://entities.add.ai') { L17: if (platform === 'darwin' && t.vncPort) { ... L28: function openViewer(t) { L29: const cmd = viewerCommand(process.platform, t); L30: if (!cmd) ``` ### 13. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/claude-config.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. var __createbinding = (this && this.__createbinding) || (object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) { if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k; var desc = object.getownpropertydescriptor(m, k); if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esmodule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) { desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } }; } object.defineproperty(o, k2, desc); }) : (function(o, m, k, k2) { if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k; o[k2] = m[k]; })); var __setmoduledefault = (this && this.__setmoduledefault) || (object.create ? (function(o, v) { object.defineproperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v }); }) : function(o, v) { o["default"] = ``` ### 14. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/autostart-mac.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/cli.js -> dist/autostart.js -> dist/autostart-mac.js L48: const path = __importStar(require("path")); L49: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L50: const autostart_1 = require("./autostart"); L51: exports.PLIST_PATH = path.join(os.homedir(), 'Library', 'LaunchAgents', `${autostart_1.LABEL}.plist`); L52: /** `` bodies are the only place user data lands in the plist, and a ... L127: * open() and the process HANGS in module resolution rather than failing. L128: * `launchctl print` says the job is fine. It is not. L129: * ... L172: try { L173: // stderr is piped, not inherited: `bootout` on a label that isn't loaded L174: // prints "Boot-out failed: 3: No such process", and that expected no-op ``` ### 15. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/self-update.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L66: exports.spawnReplacement = spawnReplacement; L67: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L68: const fs = __importStar(require("fs")); ... L75: * L76: * npx caches each invocation under `/_npx//node_modules/…`, L77: * so that segment is the reliable npx tell on every platform (checked first: ``` ### 16. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 17. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 18. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/smoke-test.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = scripts/smoke-test.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2483 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 19. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 20. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/autostart-linux.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 15 ``` ### 21. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/codex-spawn.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @addai/node@0.30.10 matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZGFpL25vZGU:0.30.10 similarity = 0.873 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 3 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 3 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3 ### Published dependency entries - @addai/node-flows ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - node-pty ^1.1.0 (Dependency) - ws ^8.21.3 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @addai/node - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.30.11 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-14T08:26:38.552Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-30T16:46:40.439Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-20T17:12:59.845Z - **Known versions:** 29 - **Latest version:** 0.30.13 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Daemon that pairs a machine with your +Ai account and runs Claude / Codex / Kimi / Gemini agents on its behalf. Reachable via Supabase from Vault, Entity Studio, or any other +Ai surface. - **Maintainers:** addai - **Keywords:** addai, entity-studio, claude, codex, kimi, gemini, agent, daemon, supabase, mcp - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18 - **Artifact files:** 220 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,944,432 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()