@addai/node@0.30.9
Daemon that pairs a machine with your +Ai account and runs Claude / Codex / Kimi / Gemini agents on its behalf. Reachable via Supabase from Vault, Entity Studio, or any other +Ai surface.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is not an install-hook attack, but its runtime deliberately weakens a foreign AI-agent permission control and persists that choice. This warrants a warning rather than a block because the trigger is an explicit daemon start and no covert exfiltration or install-time broad mutation was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Starting the daemon persistently pre-accepts Claude's dangerous-permissions warning.
- The package writes skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt: true to the user's Claude settings.
- It also marks daemon-created working directories as trusted in Claude configuration.
- The postinstall hook is limited to repairing the bundled node-pty helper executable bit.
- The Claude configuration mutation occurs when the user starts the ainode daemon, not during npm installation.
- Startup persistence is exposed through the explicit ainode startup enable command.
- No self-dependency, credential harvesting, or unrelated exfiltration path was found in the inspected files.
Source & flagged code
12 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/command-runner.jsView on unpkg · L46Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @addai/node@0.30.9.
See all versions of @addai/node for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @addai/node@0.30.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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