---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@adep/cli"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@adep/cli/v/0.1.14.md"
package: "@adep/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@adep/cli@0.1.14 npm security report"
verdict: "clean"
version: "0.1.14"
---

# @adep/cli@0.1.14 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 14 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed.

- **Verdict:** Clean
- **Product-default install policy:** Allow
- **Firewall policy:** No policy match
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** None published
- **Selected version:** 0.1.14
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

No attack surface was identified. Install does not run package code, and network, credential, and vm use happen only when a person invokes the adep CLI or the local function worker.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Clean
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-23T10:12:06.257Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-23T10:13:25.835Z
- **Download time:** 767 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1561 ms
- **AI review time:** 77249 ms
- **Total time:** 79578 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No attack surface was identified. Install does not run package code, and network, credential, and vm use happen only when a person invokes the adep CLI or the local function worker.

- **Trigger:** User runs the adep binary or starts the local function worker; npm install has no lifecycle hook.

- **Impact:** No unconsented install mutation, secret theft, or remote payload execution was found.

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-23T10:13:25.835Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Commands talk to the configured platform, store a session cookie locally, and evaluate the user's own function source in a sandbox.

- **Rationale:** The package is a first-party CLI for login, local function sandboxing, and platform deploy, with no install hook or hidden exfiltration path. Credential and vm behavior are user-invoked and stay bound to the configured platform or the project being served.

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Clean

- **Confidence:** 86.0%

- **Recommended action:** mark\_clean

- **Intent class:** Benign

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for AI clean decision:** package.json exposes the adep bin and test/build scripts only, with no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook and no self-dependency., dist/index.js builds a Commander program and parses process.argv only as the CLI entry, after the user runs the bin., Login posts the supplied email and password to the resolved platform server and writes the returned session cookie under ~/.adep with mode 0600., The default server is the package platform host, overridable by ADEP\_SERVER or --server, and later session calls use the saved server., dist/vite.js exports a Vite plugin that wires the local dev server and function proxy., dist/worker-entry.js loads a project function inside vm.runInNewContext only when started as a worker thread with workerData.

- **Evidence against:** Omitting --server sends the login password to the hardcoded host https://adep.jajabjbj.top., The function loader uses vm.runInNewContext, which is powerful if a caller feeds it untrusted project source.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @adep/cli@0.1.14.

- Review the evidence and your use of @adep/cli@0.1.14 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.14/dist/index.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L42: if (mode !== 384) {
L43: const { chmod } = await import("node:fs/promises");
L44: await chmod(file, 384);
```

### 3. Medium: Unsafe Vm Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 68.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.14/dist/index.js>)

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L12: // packages/cli/src/config.ts
L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) {
L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`;
...
L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) {
L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, "");
L19: }
...
L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8");
L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") {
...
L171: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
L172: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password })
L173: });
```

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.14/dist/index.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
await handle.writeFile(JSON.stringify(credentials, null, 2));
import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
const base = `${config.baseUrl}/api/v1/projects/${encodeURIComponent(projectId)}/files/${encodeURIComponent(path)}`;
import { mkdir as mkdir5, readFile as readFile4, readdir as readdir3, rm as rm2, stat as stat5, unlink, writeFile as writeFile4 } from "node:fs/promises";
await writeFile4(metaPath(projectId, path), JSON.stringify(payload), "utf8");
await writeFile4(dest, data);
baseUrl: options.baseUrl ?? "http://127.0.0.1:8787"
import { mkdir as mkdir6, readFile as readFile5, writeFile as writeFile5 } f
```

### 8. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.14/dist/index.js>)

Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L12: // packages/cli/src/config.ts
L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) {
L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`;
...
L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) {
L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, "");
L19: }
...
L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8");
L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") {
...
L171: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
L172: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password })
L173: });
```

### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 10. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 12. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/vite.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.14/dist/vite.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.12
matchedPath = dist/vite.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.12
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/worker-entry.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@adep/cli@0.1.14/dist/worker-entry.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.12
matchedPath = dist/worker-entry.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.12
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 4
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 2
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4

### Published dependency entries
- @adep/cf-compat 0.1.1 (Dependency)
- @adep/vite-plugin 0.1.5 (Dependency)
- commander 14.0.2 (Dependency)
- esbuild 0.25.12 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @adep/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.1.14
- **Version published:** 2026-09-15T12:14:57.374Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-05T01:09:54.939Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-01T08:33:34.379Z
- **Known versions:** 20
- **Latest version:** 0.2.2
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** \`adep\` 命令行工具包位：登录 / 初始化 / 本地调试 / 部署 / 数据库维护 / 云存储 / 静态托管 / 微前端组件（widget），实现见任务单 CLI-001 ~ CLI-003 与 FE-002；子路径 \`@adep/cli/vite\` 提供云函数 vite 插件（CLI-014）
- **Maintainers:** adep
- **Artifact files:** 5
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 794,114 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@adep/cli/v/0.1.14>)