--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@adep/cli" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@adep/cli/v/0.2.1.md" package: "@adep/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@adep/cli@0.2.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.2.1" --- # @adep/cli@0.2.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 19 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 0.2.1 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Authenticated downloads can expose the saved service credential to a different origin supplied in a platform response. No confirmed malicious recipient or active attack was established. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-01T08:23:23.345Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-01T08:25:23.471Z - **Download time:** 520 ms - **Static scan time:** 3478 ms - **AI review time:** 116127 ms - **Total time:** 120126 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Authenticated downloads can expose the saved service credential to a different origin supplied in a platform response. No confirmed malicious recipient or active attack was established. - **Trigger:** A logged-in user invokes storage download and the platform returns an absolute file URL. - **Impact:** A destination outside the authenticated service could receive its session credential. - **Evidence paths:** dist/index.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-01T08:25:23.471Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The download helper forwards the saved bearer token or session cookie to the supplied URL without an origin check. - **Rationale:** Source proves authentication headers can cross service origins during downloads, warranting a warning. No concrete malicious behavior supporting a publication block was identified. ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** Login saves a service session token with its server in dist/index.js., The API client loads saved credentials and constructs bearer or cookie authentication headers., The download helper accepts absolute HTTP URLs and sends authentication headers without checking the destination origin., Storage downloads obtain their destination from platform-returned file URLs and invoke that helper., The active storage download command exposes this behavior through an explicit user action. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no automatic install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency., Ordinary API requests use the server associated with the saved credentials., No hidden recipient, covert activation, or deliberate credential theft was identified. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @adep/cli@0.2.1. - Review the evidence and your use of @adep/cli@0.2.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L31: // packages/cli/src/browser.ts L32: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L33: function browserOpenCommand(url2, platform) { ``` ### 3. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. ### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L84: if (mode !== 384) { L85: const { chmod } = await import("node:fs/promises"); L86: await chmod(file2, 384); ``` ### 5. Medium: Unsafe Vm Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 68.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source executes code through a VM context API. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L12: // packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L31: // packages/cli/src/browser.ts L32: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L33: function browserOpenCommand(url2, platform) { ... L40: if (env["ADEP_NO_BROWSER"] === "1") return false; L41: const isTty = options.isTty ?? process.stdout.isTTY === true; L42: return isTty; ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L16: } L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L31: // packages/cli/src/browser.ts L32: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L33: function browserOpenCommand(url2, platform) { ``` ### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: await handle.writeFile(JSON.stringify(credentials, null, 2)); return { authorization: `Bearer ${decodeToken(credentials.encodedToken)}` }; if (code === "authorization_pending") { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, "content": "# {{name}}\n\n\u5012\u6570\u65E5 / \u7EAA\u5FF5\u65E5\uFF08countdown \u6A21\u677F\uFF09\u2014\u2014\u7531\u5FAE\u4FE1\u5C0F\u7A0B\u5E8F\u300C\u5012\u6570\u65E5\u300D\u7... "content": "/**\n * \u8BF7\u6C42\u9274\u6743\u5355\u5143\u6D4B\u8BD5\uFF1AOIDC \u8EAB\u4EFD\uFF08ctx.user \u2192 `oidc:<\u5E73\u53F0\u7528\u6237 id>` \u6620\u5C04\uFF09\u4E0E\n * d... "content": "/**\n * \u8BF7\u6C42\u ``` ### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L12: // packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L31: // packages/cli/src/browser.ts L32: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L33: function browserOpenCommand(url2, platform) { ... L40: if (env["ADEP_NO_BROWSER"] === "1") return false; L41: const isTty = options.isTty ?? process.stdout.isTTY === true; L42: return isTty; ``` ### 12. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L12: // packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L31: // packages/cli/src/browser.ts L32: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L33: function browserOpenCommand(url2, platform) { ... L40: if (env["ADEP_NO_BROWSER"] === "1") return false; L41: const isTty = options.isTty ?? process.stdout.isTTY === true; L42: return isTty; ``` ### 13. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L12: // packages/cli/src/config.ts L13: function resolvePaths(env = process.env) { L14: const home = env["ADEP_HOME"] ?? `${env["HOME"] ?? ""}/.adep`; ... L17: function resolveServer(env = process.env) { L18: return (env["ADEP_SERVER"] ?? "https://adep.jajabjbj.top").replace(/\/+$/, ""); L19: } ... L31: // packages/cli/src/browser.ts L32: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L33: function browserOpenCommand(url2, platform) { ... L40: if (env["ADEP_NO_BROWSER"] === "1") return false; L41: const isTty = options.isTty ?? process.stdout.isTTY === true; L42: return isTty; ``` ### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 15. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 17. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/worker-entry.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.1.12 matchedPath = dist/worker-entry.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.1.12 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 19. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @adep/cli@0.2.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QGFkZXAvY2xp:0.2.0 similarity = 0.818 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 7 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 1 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 7 ### Published dependency entries - @adep/cf-compat 0.1.1 (Dependency) - @adep/crypto 0.1.0 (Dependency) - @adep/runtime 0.3.1 (Dependency) - @adep/vite-plugin 0.1.8 (Dependency) - commander 14.0.2 (Dependency) - esbuild 0.25.12 (Dependency) - zod ^4.4.3 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @adep/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.2.1 - **Version published:** 2026-10-01T08:20:57.862Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-09-05T01:09:54.939Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-01T08:33:34.379Z - **Known versions:** 20 - **Latest version:** 0.2.2 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** \`adep\` 命令行工具包位：登录 / 初始化 / 本地调试 / 部署 / 数据库维护 / 云存储 / 静态托管 / 微前端组件（widget），实现见任务单 CLI-001 ~ CLI-003 与 FE-002；子路径 \`@adep/cli/vite\` 提供云函数 vite 插件（CLI-014） - **Maintainers:** adep - **Artifact files:** 31 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,566,464 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()