@adithyasak/t3@0.0.38-adi.3
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete automatic exfiltration or install-time attack was established, so blocking is not source-grounded. The runtime credential and tunnelling capabilities in an identity-mismatched fork warrant a warning.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source closely matched a different package identity
Trigger
A user runs the CLI and enables or invokes its managed connection or session-resume features.
Impact
A compromised or misconfigured relay path could expose local agent-service capability or sensitive process environment.
Mechanism
Credential-file access and environment-inheriting tunnel launch.
AI rationale
No concrete automatic exfiltration or install-time attack was established, so blocking is not source-grounded. The runtime credential and tunnelling capabilities in an identity-mismatched fork warrant a warning.
Evidence
dist/bin.mjs~/.claude/.credentials.json
Network endpoints1
relay.t3.codes
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 78.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The bundled CLI reads a Claude credential file from the user profile.
- A managed tunnel starts a child process with the full inherited environment and a tunnel token.
- The package is a scoped fork but its bundled CLI identifies a different upstream project.
Evidence against
- package.json has no install lifecycle hook.
- The inspected registry request only fetches a latest-version record.
- No direct upload of harvested credentials to npm or another endpoint was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
20 flaggeddist/bin.mjsView file
3import { _ as __commonJSMin, a as isQuitError, b as __toESM, c as layer$99, d as pipeThroughDuplex, f as toArrayBuffer, g as ChildProcessSpawner, h as make$146, i as Terminal$1, l ...
L4: import { $ as declare, $a as modifyDelay, $c as days, $i as retry, $l as isFailure$1, $n as makeUnsafe$8, $o as _await, $r as filterOrFail, $s as map$9, $t as apply, A as Record, A...
L5: import { $ as runCollect, $t as make$161, A as fromQueue, At as forEach$1, B as mapError$1, Bt as mapEffect$2, C as fromArray, Cn as runIn, Ct as make$158, D as fromIterable$2, E a...
...
L9: import { createRequire } from "node:module";
L10: import * as NodeChildProcess from "node:child_process";
L11: import { Duplex, Readable } from "node:stream";
...
L20: import { cwd } from "process";
L21: import * as NodeNet from
Critical
Sensitive Archive Exfiltration
Source archives sensitive local configuration and publishes encoded chunks through an authenticated package-registry request.
dist/bin.mjsView on unpkg · L33import { _ as __commonJSMin, a as isQuitError, b as __toESM, c as layer$99, d as pipeThroughDuplex, f as toArrayBuffer, g as ChildProcessSpawner, h as make$146, i as Terminal$1, l ...
L4: import { $ as declare, $a as modifyDelay, $c as days, $i as retry, $l as isFailure$1, $n as makeUnsafe$8, $o as _await, $r as filterOrFail, $s as map$9, $t as apply, A as Record, A...
L5: import { $ as runCollect, $t as make$161, A as fromQueue, At as forEach$1, B as mapError$1, Bt as mapEffect$2, C as fromArray, Cn as runIn, Ct as make$158, D as fromIterable$2, E a...
...
L9: import { createRequire } from "node:module";
L10: import * as NodeChildProcess from "node:child_process";
L11: import { Duplex, Readable } from "node:stream";
...
L20: import { cwd } from "process";
L21: import * as NodeNet from
Findings
4 Critical13 High6 Medium4 Low
CriticalSensitive Archive Exfiltrationdist/bin.mjs
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/bin.mjs
CriticalEncrypted Payload Temp Executiondist/bin.mjs
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/bin.mjs
HighChild Processdist/bin.mjs
HighShelldist/bin.mjs
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/bin.mjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/bin.mjs
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/bin.mjs
HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/bin.mjs
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/NodeServices-PlpNz7qN.mjs
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @adithyasak/t3@0.0.38-adi.3.
See all versions of @adithyasak/t3 for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @adithyasak/t3@0.0.38-adi.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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