registry / @aerodrome-finance/contracts / 1.1.0

@aerodrome-finance/contracts@1.1.0

Aerodrome Finance protocol contracts.

AI Security Review

scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Install-time code collects credentials, environment secrets, and host metadata, then exfiltrates them externally.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

npm preinstall or postinstall

Impact

Exposes developer, cloud, SSH, Git, npm, Kubernetes, and wallet secrets available during install.

Mechanism

credential harvesting followed by HTTPS POST

Attack narrative

npm lifecycle hooks run index.js automatically. It filters environment variables for secret-like names, reads common credentials and project environment files, includes host and user metadata, then sends the JSON body to a fixed webhook.site endpoint. Failures are deliberately ignored so installation completes.

Rationale

Direct source inspection confirms an automatic install-time credential-exfiltration chain with no package-aligned purpose.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js.env.env.local.env.production.env.developmentsecrets.env

Network endpoints1

webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

@aerodrome-finance/contracts is a malicious npm package that impersonates Aerodrome Finance. It carries no legitimate functionality; the published tarball contains only a package.json and an install-time payload (index.js). Both `preinstall` and `postinstall` run `node index.js || true`, so the code executes automatically when the package is installed. Version 1.0.0 harvests environment variables whose names match `KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|RPC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|KUBE|VAULT|AUTH|PGP|GPG|SEED|WALLET`, the contents of `~/.npmrc` and `~/.gitconfig`, and directory listings of `~/.ssh`, `~/.foundry/keystores`, `~/.config/hardhat`, and `~/.config/gcloud`, along with the hostname, username, working directory, and platform. The collected JSON is exfiltrated via an HTTPS POST to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. Errors are swallowed so the install never visibly fails. Version 1.1.0, published roughly 2.5 hours after 1.0.0 for all six packages within the same ~9-second window, reads full file contents (up to 4000 bytes) instead of just listing them. New targets include `.aws/credentials`, `.aws/config`, `.ssh/id_rsa`, `.ssh/id_ed25519`, `.ssh/config`, `.kube/config`, `.docker/config.json`, `.netrc`, `.pgpass`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, and two GCP credential files (`application_default_credentials.json` and `legacy_credentials`) — the `~/.config/gcloud` directory listing is still collected too. It also reads local `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production`, `.env.development`, and `secrets.env` files from the working directory, and adds cryptocurrency wallet theft: key files from Solana, Anchor, NEAR, and Sui wallet paths, plus the first three files under `~/.foundry/keystores`. The credential regex gains BEARER, API, INFURA, ALCHEMY, HELIUS, QUICKNODE, ANKR, and PRIVATE_KEY to catch RPC and API provider tokens. Both versions exfiltrate to the same webhook.site endpoint. In 1.0.0, index.js opens with a fake comment claiming it is `@plumenetwork/nest-artifacts`, an unrelated install-time shim — `@plumenetwork/nest-artifacts` is not itself a malicious package, just a leftover label from whatever template the attacker reused across this batch, published by npm account `mssjeep843`. The fake comment was removed in 1.1.0. Five sibling packages from the same account impersonate Euler's EVC, Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, and the BoringVault pattern, sharing this same webhook.site endpoint, byte-identical payload template, and 1.0.0-to-1.1.0 escalation. Two further packages from the same account (PyPI `dlmm` and `dlmm-sdk`, impersonating Meteora's DLMM SDK) ran an equivalent harvester and are tracked separately as MAL-2026-13728 and MAL-2026-13729. Any environment that installed either version should rotate the exposed secrets and treat harvested keys as compromised, prioritizing wallet private keys and RPC/API tokens if 1.1.0 was installed. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (2c46806c21e6a0f5a5593eca11bbd822991f566dc05eb50c7ec56f88b649c3be) Package name typosquats the legitimate @aerodrome-finance scope. Lifecycle hooks auto-execute index.js on npm install, which reads installer secrets from ~/.aws/, ~/.ssh/, ~/.kube/, ~/.docker/, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud/solana/anchor/sui key directories, Foundry keystores, and.env files, and scrapes process.env for keys matching KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|WALLET|SEED. The collected data is POSTed to a hardcoded webhook.site endpoint via https.request from a detached child process (spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'})) that sleeps 60-240 seconds before sending, to outlive install and scan windows. Sandbox/honeypot evasion is present: host regex checks for scan-/detonation/sandbox/ubuntu-fc-uvm prefixes, non-root/sandbox user checks, canarytoken/honey env checks, and a check for npm mirror registries. Static evidence confirms co-use of child_process, https, os, and fs, with os.hostname() and a POST to https.request in index.js.

@aerodrome-finance/contracts@1.1.0

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code