@agent-link/agent@0.1.332
AgentLink local agent CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source shows a gated global-install runtime migration and explicit CLI service setup, plus project-scoped agent session and memory operations. The scanner hints do not establish malicious behavior or unconsented broad agent configuration mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook delegates to a bridge preparer only for global npm installs; the preparer skips unless the runtime was already adopted and a newer version is available.
- The Codex and Claude integrations access their respective session directories, and Claude memory files are scoped to a project folder with filename checks for updates.
- Auto-start service installation is exposed as an explicit CLI command; service code creates a launch specification and installs it when invoked.
- The launcher handles platform service startup as part of runtime management; inspected source showed no package-install-triggered broad agent configuration change.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/emergency-upgrade.jsView on unpkg · L4Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agent-link/agent@0.1.332.
See all versions of @agent-link/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agent-link/agent@0.1.332 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.