@agent-link/agent@0.1.333
AgentLink local agent CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook delegates to package-owned setup gated on global npm installation, while inspected persistence is tied to an explicit service command. The flagged agent paths are scoped to Codex or project-specific Claude data, and the inspected source did not establish a concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest routes the postinstall hook to a package-owned bridge script, and that script runs its setup only for global npm installs.
- Codex session titles are stored under the package configuration directory; Claude history and memory paths are scoped to the current user and project.
- Service persistence is exposed through the explicit `service install` command, which invokes service installation.
- The launcher writes a user service plist as part of that service setup.
- Inspected source did not establish credential theft, unrelated data exfiltration, or another concrete attack.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/emergency-upgrade.jsView on unpkg · L4Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agent-link/agent@0.1.333.
See all versions of @agent-link/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agent-link/agent@0.1.333 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.