@agent-link/agent@0.1.340
AgentLink local agent CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found a guarded global-install version bridge and product-aligned runtime operations, with no concrete attack behavior established. The static hints do not change that assessment.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook runs only for global npm installs; its bridge skips packages without an adopted version store and only proceeds for a newer release.
- The flagged agent paths are used for Codex and Claude session history or memory, and Copilot review output filters internal plan paths.
- Inspected runtime code supports executable-path lookup, requested file and Git operations, backend session handling, and local session-file writes.
- Service persistence is part of service setup, and the package exposes it through its CLI; no attack behavior was identified in the inspected paths.
- The emergency-upgrade code names AgentLink release manifests at msclaude.ai.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/emergency-upgrade.jsView on unpkg · L4Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agent-link/agent@0.1.340.
See all versions of @agent-link/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agent-link/agent@0.1.340 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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