registry / @agent-qofeno/agentx-cli / 3.0.1

@agent-qofeno/agentx-cli@3.0.1

To install dependencies:

AI Security Review

scanned 3h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The manifest declares no install hook, and the flagged runtime code performs conditional language server setup rather than sending command output. The required bundled dependency manifests and entrypoints show no install hooks or attack behavior.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A matching language project activates language server setup when the CLI runtime requests it.

Impact

No malicious impact was identified from the inspected behavior.

Mechanism

The code checks for the relevant tool and may download its project archive if the tool is absent and downloads are enabled; no command-output transfer was found.

AI rationale

Network endpoints1

github.com/microsoft/vscode-eslint/archive/refs/heads/main.zip

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The package manifest lists development and build scripts and maps both command names to the launcher; it declares no install lifecycle hook.
The postinstall-named file installs a platform binary only when a matching optional dependency is available; the manifest does not wire this file as an install hook.
The language server code checks for the matching project tool and downloads its project archive only when that tool is missing and downloads are enabled.
The inspected bundled SDK and provider manifests and entrypoints show protocol and provider library code; their manifests contain no postinstall hook.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

script/postinstall.mjsView file

Lines 1-22javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3import childProcess from "child_process"

4import fs from "fs"

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

script/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L2

5import os from "os"

6import path from "path"

7import { createRequire } from "module"

8import { fileURLToPath } from "url"

10const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))

11const require = createRequire(import.meta.url)

12const packageJson = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "package.json"), "utf8"))

14const platformMap = {

15 darwin: "darwin",

16 linux: "linux",

17 win32: "windows",

18}

19const archMap = {

20 x64: "x64",

21 arm64: "arm64",

22 arm: "arm",

script/time.tsView file

Lines 1-7typescript

1#!/usr/bin/env bun

3import path from "path"

4const toDynamicallyImport = path.join(process.cwd(), process.argv[2])

5await import(toDynamicallyImport)

src/lsp/server.tsView file

Lines 1-21typescript

1import type { ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams } from "child_process"

2import path from "path"

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

src/lsp/server.tsView on unpkg · L1

3import os from "os"

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

script/postinstall.mjsView file

2L3: import childProcess from "child_process" L4: import fs from "fs"

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

script/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L2

script/time.tsView file

4const toDynamicallyImport = path.join(process.cwd(), process.argv[2]) L5: await import(toDynamicallyImport) L6: console.log(performance.now())

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

script/time.tsView on unpkg · L4

src/lsp/server.tsView file

•bounded command output exfiltration = }\n\n const parentdir = path.dirname(currentdir)\n if (parentdir === currentdir) break \n currentdir = parentdir\n\n \n if (!currentdir.startswith(ctx.worktree)) break\n }\n\n return crateroot\n },\n extensions: [".rs"],\n async spawn(root) {\n const bin = which("rust-analyzer")\n if (!bin) {\n return\n }\n return {\n process: spawn(bin, {\n cwd: root,\n }),\n }\n },\n}\n\nexport const clangd: info = {\n id: "clangd",\n root: nearestroot(["compile_commands.json", "compile_flags.txt", ".clangd"]),\n extensions: [".c", ".cpp", ".cc", ".cxx", ".c++", ".h", ".hpp", ".hh", ".hxx", ".h++"],\n async spawn(root, _ctx, fl

Findings

1 Critical3 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationsrc/lsp/server.ts

HighChild Processscript/postinstall.mjs

HighShell

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitysrc/lsp/server.ts

MediumDynamic Requirescript/time.ts

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowEval

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @agent-qofeno/agentx-cli@3.0.1.

See all versions of @agent-qofeno/agentx-cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @agent-qofeno/agentx-cli@3.0.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-23 02:01:56.264Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.