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@agentgates/cli@0.44.1: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @agentgates/cli / 0.44.1

@agentgates/cli@0.44.1

Wallet operations for AI agents and humans

AI Security Review

scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. npm postinstall rewrites Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf instruction files in the home directory without asking. Those files then steer later agent sessions to this CLI for wallet and password actions.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install runs the published postinstall script

Impact

Installed coding agents are told to send, swap, earn, and mint passwords through this CLI

Mechanism

unconsented install-time write into foreign AI-agent instruction files

Policy narrative

On npm install, postinstall.mjs silently edits Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf instruction files in the user home directory. Those files then tell later agent sessions to run this CLI for wallet send, swap, earn, and password minting instead of the host tools. The hook does not ask for consent; it only skips machines that lack those folders and it swallows write errors so install still succeeds.

AI rationale

The published postinstall mutates foreign AI-agent instruction files without consent, which is install-time control-surface hijack. The bundled CLI is a user-invoked wallet product and does not authorize rewriting Claude, Cursor, or Windsurf rules during npm install.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjs~/.claude/CLAUDE.md~/.cursor/rules/agentgates.md~/.windsurfrules

Decision evidence

AI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 96.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for policy risk

Automatic npm postinstall runs scripts/postinstall.mjs and ignores failures.
When ~/.claude exists, postinstall writes a marked instruction block into CLAUDE.md.
When ~/.cursor exists, postinstall creates ~/.cursor/rules/agentgates.md.
When ~/.windsurfrules exists, postinstall injects the same instruction block.
The injected block tells other agents to use this CLI for wallet send, swap, earn, and password operations instead of MCP tools.
The hook prints a banner for the installing AI session and does not ask the user first.

Evidence against

package.json does not depend on another release of @agentgates/cli.
dist/cli.mjs is a user-invoked Agentgates wallet CLI that talks to agentgates.ai after a command is run.
prepare only rebuilds when local esbuild is present.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNativeBindingsNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 2 file(s), 3.18 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, 1rpc.io, agentgates.ai, api-amoy.polygonscan.com, api-goerli-optimistic.etherscan.io, api-goerli.arbiscan.io, api-goerli.etherscan.io, api-holesky.etherscan.io, api-optimistic.etherscan.io, api-sepolia.basescan.org, api-sepolia.etherscan.io, api-testnet.bscscan.com, api-testnet.polygonscan.com, api.arbiscan.io, api.basescan.org, api.bscscan.com, api.devnet.solana.com, api.etherscan.io, api.mainnet-beta.solana.com, api.polygonscan.com, api.testnet.solana.com, arb1.arbitrum.io, arbiscan.io, arbitrum.blockscout.com, arbitrum.drpc.org, base-sepolia.blockscout.com, base.blockscout.com, base.drpc.org, basescan.org, cli.agentgates.ai, cloudflare-eth.com, covenant-backend.vercel.app, developer.mozilla.org, docs.ethers.org, etc.blockscout.com, eth-holesky.blockscout.com, eth-sepolia.blockscout.com, eth.blockscout.com, etherscan.io, gasstation-testnet.polygon.technology, gasstation.polygon.technology, gateway.ipfs.io, github.com, gnosis.blockscout.com, mainnet.base.org, optimism-sepolia.blockscout.com, optimism.blockscout.com, polygon-rpc.com, polygon.blockscout.com, polygon.drpc.org

Source & flagged code

12 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs || exit 0

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs || exit 0

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/cli.mjsView file

56* Constructs the CommanderError class L57: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L58: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L982: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter; L983: var childProcess2 = __require("node:child_process"); L984: var path8 = __require("node:path"); ... L1031: this._outputConfiguration = { L1032: writeOut: (str2) => process8.stdout.write(str2), L1033: writeErr: (str2) => process8.stderr.write(str2), ... L1067: * @returns {Command[]} L1068: * @private L1069: */

Critical

Wallet Drain

Source uses private key material to transfer cryptocurrency funds.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L56

56Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/agentgates -> dist/cli.mjs L56: * Constructs the CommanderError class L57: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L58: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L982: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter; L983: var childProcess2 = __require("node:child_process"); L984: var path8 = __require("node:path"); ... L1031: this._outputConfiguration = { L1032: writeOut: (str2) => process8.stdout.write(str2), L1033: writeErr: (str2) => process8.stderr.write(str2), ... L1067: * @returns {Command[]} L1068: * @private L1069: */

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L56

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.mjs: function getIpfsGatewayFunc(baseUrl) { return new FetchRequest(`${baseUrl}${match[2]}`); headers["authorization"] = `Basic ${encodeBase64(toUtf8Bytes(this.#creds))}`; * The value that will be sent for the ``Authorization`` header. * Sets an ``Authorization`` for %%username%% with %%password%%. * a custom gateway baseUrl. static createIpfsGatewayFunc(baseUrl) { return getIpfsGatewayFunc(baseUrl);

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg

52006var _256n2 = BigInt(256); L52007: var _0x71n2 = BigInt(113); L52008: var SHA3_PI2 = [];

High

Obfuscated Payload Loader

Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L52006

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @agentgates/cli@0.44.0 matchedPath = dist/cli.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QGFnZW50Z2F0ZXMvY2xp:0.44.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = bea0b2a788e291de signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @agentgates/cli@0.44.0 matchedPath = dist/cli.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QGFnZW50Z2F0ZXMvY2xp:0.44.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg

56* Constructs the CommanderError class L57: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L58: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L982: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter; L983: var childProcess2 = __require("node:child_process"); L984: var path8 = __require("node:path"); ... L1031: this._outputConfiguration = { L1032: writeOut: (str2) => process8.stdout.write(str2), L1033: writeErr: (str2) => process8.stderr.write(str2), ... L1067: * @returns {Command[]} L1068: * @private L1069: */

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L56

scripts/postinstall.mjsView file

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "fs"; L3: import { join } from "path"; ... L48: if (!existsSync(filePath)) { L49: writeFileSync(filePath, wrapped + "\n", "utf-8"); L50: return "created"; ... L58: ); L59: writeFileSync(filePath, content.replace(re, wrapped), "utf-8"); L60: return "updated"; ... L62: L63: writeFileSync(filePath, content.trimEnd() + "\n\n" + wrapped + "\n", "utf-8"); L64: return "appended";

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L1

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. ns the lane itself over signed http. \`\`\` agentgates passwords init # mint twelve words + the key (once); --seed "<words>" brings words; agentgates_passwords_seed works too agentgates passwords add --label <name> --host <site> --username <u> --password <p> agentgates passwords allow [--agent <addr>] [--ask-me] # permit yourself, or another agent agentgates passwords use --url https://<site>/login # log in through the cvm, get the page back agentgates passwords list # what this key holds and may use agentgates passwords invite # print a link a person opens to take the ow

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

12 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 17-57json

17 "license": "MIT",

18 "homepage": "https://agentgates.ai",

19 "repository": {

20 "type": "git",

21 "url": "git+https://github.com/Carlos-Sotop/agentgates-ai-cli.git"

22 },

23 "author": "Agentgates",

24 "type": "module",

25 "bin": {

26 "agentgates": "bin/agentgates"

27 },

28 "files": [

29 "bin",

30 "dist/cli.mjs",

31 "scripts/postinstall.mjs",

32 "README.md"

33 ],

34 "scripts": {

35 "build": "esbuild src/main.ts --bundle --platform=node --format=esm --outfile=dist/cli.mjs --define:process.env.CLI_VERSION=\"\\\"$npm_package_version\\\"\" --banner:js=\"import{createRequire}from'module';const require=createRequire(import.meta.url);\"",

36 "build:tsc": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",

37 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs || exit 0",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L37

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L37

38 "prepare": "[ -x node_modules/.bin/esbuild ] && npm run build || true",

39 "dev": "tsc -w -p tsconfig.json",

40 "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",

41 "test": "tsc -p tsconfig.json && node --test test/*.test.mjs",

42 "bounty": "node bin/bounty",

43 "sync:bounty-shared": "node scripts/sync-bounty-shared.mjs",

44 "clean": "rm -rf dist"

45 },

46 "engines": {

47 "node": ">=20"

48 },

49 "devDependencies": {

50 "@solana/web3.js": "^1.98.4",

51 "@types/node": "^22.10.0",

52 "commander": "^12.1.0",

53 "esbuild": "^0.28.0",

54 "ethers": "^6.16.0",

55 "open": "^10.1.0",

56 "picocolors": "^1.1.1",

57 "typescript": "^5.6.3"

dist/cli.mjsView file

56* Constructs the CommanderError class L57: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L58: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L982: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter; L983: var childProcess2 = __require("node:child_process"); L984: var path8 = __require("node:path"); ... L1031: this._outputConfiguration = { L1032: writeOut: (str2) => process8.stdout.write(str2), L1033: writeErr: (str2) => process8.stderr.write(str2), ... L1067: * @returns {Command[]} L1068: * @private L1069: */

Critical

Wallet Drain

Source uses private key material to transfer cryptocurrency funds.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L56

56Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/agentgates -> dist/cli.mjs L56: * Constructs the CommanderError class L57: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L58: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L982: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter; L983: var childProcess2 = __require("node:child_process"); L984: var path8 = __require("node:path"); ... L1031: this._outputConfiguration = { L1032: writeOut: (str2) => process8.stdout.write(str2), L1033: writeErr: (str2) => process8.stderr.write(str2), ... L1067: * @returns {Command[]} L1068: * @private L1069: */

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L56

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.mjs: function getIpfsGatewayFunc(baseUrl) { return new FetchRequest(`${baseUrl}${match[2]}`); headers["authorization"] = `Basic ${encodeBase64(toUtf8Bytes(this.#creds))}`; * The value that will be sent for the ``Authorization`` header. * Sets an ``Authorization`` for %%username%% with %%password%%. * a custom gateway baseUrl. static createIpfsGatewayFunc(baseUrl) { return getIpfsGatewayFunc(baseUrl);

scripts/postinstall.mjsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "fs";

3import { join } from "path";

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

scripts/postinstall.mjsView on unpkg · L1

4import { homedir } from