@agentvox/host@0.1.22
AgentVox host daemon — runs on machines you want to control hands-free via the AgentVox voice app.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe only npm lifecycle hook chmods a dependency helper and does not touch agent control files. Reading Claude session logs and talking to the package proxy are user-started features of this voice-control host, not a hidden install attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes agentvox-host and agentvox-vox bins and a postinstall that only runs scripts/fix-pty-helper.mjs.
- That postinstall script chmod 0755s node-pty prebuild spawn-helper when the executable bit is missing, then exits.
- dist/cli.js parseClaude only reads ~/.claude/projects JSONL for the last user line of a named agent and does not write Claude or Codex settings.
- dist/vox.js is a user-run CLI whose default proxy is https://proxy.agentvox.bot and can be overridden with AGENTVOX_PROXY.
- When the host or vox process is started, it can globally npm-install a newer release of itself unless AGENTVOX_AUTO_UPDATE=0.
- Default agent launch arguments include Claude bypassPermissions and Codex dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox, which is the stated hands-free control behavior.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.
dist/vox.jsView on unpkg · L13Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agentvox/host@0.1.22.
See all versions of @agentvox/host for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agentvox/host@0.1.22 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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