registry / @agentvox/host / 0.1.25
@agentvox/host@0.1.25
AgentVox host daemon — runs on machines you want to control hands-free via the AgentVox voice app.
AI Security Review
scanned 21d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source ties the integration to configured agent history and sends the xAI key to xAI’s fixed endpoint. The reviewed evidence does not establish credential exfiltration or another concrete attack.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The host’s agent status flow reads Claude session history; the realtime voice flow requests a session when invoked.
Impact
No malicious effect or untrusted credential destination was established.
Mechanism
The Claude parser reads local session files. The realtime flow loads the xAI key from its documented local sources and posts it to xAI’s client-secrets endpoint.
AI rationale
Inspected source ties the integration to configured agent history and sends the xAI key to xAI’s fixed endpoint. The reviewed evidence does not establish credential exfiltration or another concrete attack.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.jsdist/vox.js
Network endpoints1
api.x.ai/v1/realtime/client_secrets
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json’s postinstall runs a helper script; prepublishOnly runs build and tests.
- The Claude integration reads session history from the user’s `.claude/projects` directory; its caller selects a parser for the configured agent class.
- The xAI key comes from `XAI_API_KEY` or `~/.agentvox/xai.key`.
- The realtime session request sends that key to the fixed xAI client-secrets endpoint.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
WildcardDependency
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node ./scripts/fix-pty-helper.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/vox.jsView file
13import { join } from "path";
L14: import { spawnSync } from "child_process";
L15: var REGISTRY = "https://registry.npmjs.org";
L16: var CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 6 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
...
L22: return null;
L23: const j = await r.json();
L24: return typeof j.version === "string" ? j.version : null;
...
L49: const fetchLatest = deps.fetchLatest ?? defaultFetchLatest;
L50: const pinned = process.env.AGENTVOX_VERSION;
L51: const latest = pinned ?? await fetchLatest(deps.pkg);
...
L112: var acquireInstanceLock = (name, log2) => {
L113: const dir = join(homedir(), ".agentvox");
Critical
Remote Asset Decode Execute
Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.
dist/vox.jsView on unpkg · L13•Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/vox.js
Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern.
Findings
2 Critical4 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalRemote Asset Decode Executedist/vox.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/vox.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processdist/vox.js
HighHost Fingerprint Exfiltrationdist/vox.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/vox.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperscripts/install-systemd.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumWildcard Dependency
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agentvox/host@0.1.25.
See all versions of @agentvox/host for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agentvox/host@0.1.25 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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