@agentvox/host@0.1.37
AgentVox host daemon — runs on machines you want to control hands-free via the AgentVox voice app.
AI Security Review
scanned 18d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe agent-integration location is reachable through a remote activity request and returns recent local conversation text over the configured authenticated proxy. This is a sensitive remote-control capability; the inspected source does not establish an attack or an unrelated credential recipient.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json points the host and Vox commands to the reviewed CLI entrypoints; postinstall only runs the node-pty helper permission fix.
- The CLI parser reads local Claude project session logs, and an incoming agent.activity request invokes it and returns results to the requester.
- The CLI connects to its configured proxy using the saved bearer token; Vox uses that configured proxy and token for host-roster requests.
- When the daemon is running, an authenticated proxy connection can request recent local agent conversation text; this exposes sensitive data through the product’s remote agent-activity feature.
- The inspected source does not establish that the configured proxy is restricted to an operator-controlled destination.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.
dist/vox.jsView on unpkg · L13Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agentvox/host@0.1.37.
See all versions of @agentvox/host for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agentvox/host@0.1.37 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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