@agentvox/host@0.1.39
AgentVox host daemon — runs on machines you want to control hands-free via the AgentVox voice app.
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found package-aligned proxy communication, request-triggered agent activity reporting, and a narrowly scoped postinstall permission fix. The flagged decompression path stores board database data rather than executing a payload.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook runs a helper that only makes node-pty's spawn helper executable when needed.
- The flagged CLI code reads Claude session history for agent activity; the activity handler runs on an agent.activity request and sends its result to the requester.
- The CLI and Vox send host metadata to the configured proxy as part of their connection; the default proxy is the package's AgentVox service.
- The Vox gzip path writes decoded bytes into its board database replica; it does not execute them.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.
dist/vox.jsView on unpkg · L13Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agentvox/host@0.1.39.
See all versions of @agentvox/host for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agentvox/host@0.1.39 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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