registry / @ai-dev-methodologies/rlp-desk / 0.27.0
@ai-dev-methodologies/rlp-desk@0.27.0
Fresh-context iterative loops for Claude Code — autonomous task completion with independent verification
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe install-time extension setup warrants a warning under the agent extension lifecycle policy. The flagged runtime locations do not establish a separate attack.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
npm install runs the package's postinstall hook.
Impact
The package extension becomes available to Claude Code after installation.
Mechanism
The hook copies the command and package runtime to paths under ~/.claude.
AI rationale
The install-time extension setup warrants a warning under the agent extension lifecycle policy. The flagged runtime locations do not establish a separate attack.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsscripts/install-manifest.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 89.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The postinstall hook runs automatically and copies the package command and runtime into the user's Claude directories, setting up a package-owned extension.
- The flagged runtime locations concern a legacy gitignore rule, an installed runner path, a legacy verdict migration comment, and campaign metadata in a local registry; they show no separate agent control action.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgscripts/postinstall.jsView file
33function ensureDir(dirPath) {
L34: fs.mkdirSync(dirPath, { recursive: true });
L35: }
...
L40: // Security review v5.7 follow-up: lstatSync first; SKIP symlinks entirely so
L41: // a hostile symlink (e.g., ~/.claude/ralph-desk/foo -> /etc/passwd) cannot
L42: // be chmod'd via unlockTree's chmodSync (which follows symlinks).
...
L95: // ONLY if a developer ran sync from an installed copy back to the source —
L96: // which is forbidden by CLAUDE.md. But re-running install over an existing
L97: // installed file (e.g., npm i again) does NOT need re-injection because
L98: // copyFileSync replaced the file with the source contents. The check below
L99: // is defensive — only inject when the file does not already start with a
...
L113: const tailBuf = original.subarray(newlineIdx + 1);
Findings
1 Critical4 High5 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/postinstall.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/postinstall.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedsrc/node/run.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltascripts/postinstall.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/postinstall.js
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperinstall.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ai-dev-methodologies/rlp-desk@0.27.0.
See all versions of @ai-dev-methodologies/rlp-desk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ai-dev-methodologies/rlp-desk@0.27.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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