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@aisystemresources/emdee@0.24.4: Malicious npm security report | LPM Firewall

registry / @aisystemresources/emdee / 0.24.4

@aisystemresources/emdee@0.24.4

Local-first document management with markdown rendering, knowledge graph, and MCP server.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

An npm postinstall hook writes package-provided Claude skill content into the user's Claude control surface. This occurs automatically during installation and is not restricted to an explicit CLI action.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package runs the postinstall lifecycle hook.

Impact

Package-controlled instructions become available to Claude Code without an installation-time consent step.

Mechanism

The hook launches the skills installer, which creates the default Claude skills directory and copies package files into it.

Attack narrative

The package declares postinstall, which launches its skills installer automatically. The installer targets the user's Claude skills directory by default, creates it if necessary, and copies package-provided skill files there. The optional environment opt-out does not establish consent because the default installation path mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface before the user invokes any command.

AI rationale

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface. The lifecycle behavior meets the install-hook abuse blocking policy even though no network exfiltration was identified.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjsdist/cli/skills-install.js~/.claude/skills

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

15 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/emdee.jsView file

2import { Command } from "commander"; L3: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { existsSync } from "node:fs";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/emdee.jsView on unpkg · L2

273const docs = path.resolve(process.cwd(), opts.docs); L274: const child = spawn("npx", ["vite", "--port", opts.port], { L275: cwd: pkgRoot,

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

bin/emdee.jsView on unpkg · L273

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @aisystemresources/emdee@0.24.3 matchedPath = bin/emdee.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.24.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/emdee.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 96fe776c12b8db60 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @aisystemresources/emdee@0.24.3 matchedPath = bin/emdee.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.24.3 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 36 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/emdee.jsView on unpkg

dist/mcp/server.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/mcp/server.jsView on unpkg

18function adminClient() { L19: const key = process.env.SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY ?? process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY; L20: return createClient( ... L1114: const admin = adminClient(); L1115: const { data: direct } = await admin.from("doc_shares").select("id, share_root").eq("grantee_id", granteeId).eq("owner_id", ownerId).eq("path_prefix", relPath).eq("permission", "wr... L1116: if (direct && isWithinShareRootBoundary(relPath, direct.share_root)) return true; ... L1895: { "name": "get_image", "description": "Fetch an image from the vault and return it as a visual content block so you can see and analyze it. Use this to label images (patch_preamble... L1896: { "name": "upload_image", "description": "Upload an image (jpg/png/gif/webp/svg) as base64 to the vault. Creates a markdown doc tha

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/mcp/server.jsView on unpkg · L18

dist/cli/auth-commands.jsView file

6import { readFile, writeFile, mkdir, unlink, chmod, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; L7: import { createServer } from "node:http"; L8: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L9: import path from "node:path"; L10: import os from "node:os"; L11: var CREDS_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), ".config", "emdee"); L12: var CREDS_PATH = path.join(CREDS_DIR, "credentials.json"); L13: var DEFAULT_HOST = process.env.EMDEE_CLOUD_URL ?? "https://emdee.tech"; L14: var LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3; ... L20: }; L21: function base64url(buf) { L22: return buf.toString("base64").replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");

Critical

Reverse Shell

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

dist/cli/auth-commands.jsView on unpkg · L6

6import { readFile, writeFile, mkdir, unlink, chmod, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; L7: import { createServer } from "node:http"; L8: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L9: import path from "node:path"; ... L12: var CREDS_PATH = path.join(CREDS_DIR, "credentials.json"); L13: var DEFAULT_HOST = process.env.EMDEE_CLOUD_URL ?? "https://emdee.tech"; L14: var LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/cli/auth-commands.jsView on unpkg · L6

6import { readFile, writeFile, mkdir, unlink, chmod, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; L7: import { createServer } from "node:http"; L8: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L9: import path from "node:path"; L10: import os from "node:os"; L11: var CREDS_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), ".config", "emdee"); L12: var CREDS_PATH = path.join(CREDS_DIR, "credentials.json"); L13: var DEFAULT_HOST = process.env.EMDEE_CLOUD_URL ?? "https://emdee.tech"; L14: var LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3; ... L20: }; L21: function base64url(buf) { L22: return buf.toString("base64").replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");

src/cli/auth.tsView file

12import { readFile, writeFile, mkdir, unlink, chmod, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; L13: import { createServer, type Server } from "node:http"; L14: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L15: import path from "node:path"; ... L17: L18: const CREDS_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), ".config", "emdee"); L19: const CREDS_PATH = path.join(CREDS_DIR, "credentials.json"); L20: export const DEFAULT_HOST = process.env.EMDEE_CLOUD_URL ?? "https://emdee.tech"; L21: const LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; ... L37: // PKCE helpers per RFC 7636. L38: function base64url(buf: Buffer): string { L39: return buf.toString("base64").replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

src/cli/auth.tsView on unpkg · L12

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @aisystemresources/emdee@0.24.3 matchedPath = src/cli/auth.ts matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.24.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/cli/auth.tsView on unpkg

dist/cli/skills-install.jsView file

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: import { readdir, mkdir, copyfile, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; import { parseargs } from "node:util"; import path from "node:path"; import os from "node:os"; import { fileurltopath } from "node:url"; var default_target = path.join(os.homedir(), ".claude", "skills"); var pkg_root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileurltopath(import.meta.url)), "..", ".."); var skills_src = path.join(pkg_root, "skills"); async function copydirrecursive(srcdir, destdir) { await mkdir(destdir, { recursive: true }); const entries = await readdir(srcdir, { withfiletypes: true }); let count = 0; for (const entry of entries) { const srcpath = path.join(srcdir, entry.name); const destpath = path.join(destdir,

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/cli/skills-install.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

15 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 11-51json

11 "emdee": "bin/emdee.js"

12 },

13 "publishConfig": {

14 "access": "public"

15 },

16 "scripts": {

17 "dev": "next dev --webpack",

18 "build": "next build --webpack",

19 "start": "next start",

20 "lint": "eslint",

21 "mcp": "tsx src/mcp/server.ts",

22 "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",

23 "test:context": "node --import tsx --test scripts/test-context-startup.ts scripts/test-context-tools.ts",

24 "e2e": "playwright test",

25 "e2e:ui": "playwright test --ui",

26 "e2e:report": "playwright show-report",

27 "check:migrations": "node scripts/check-migration-drift.mjs",

28 "ci-package": "node scripts/verify-package.mjs",

29 "build:cli": "node scripts/build-cli.mjs",

30 "prepublishOnly": "node scripts/build-cli.mjs",

31 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L31

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L31

32 "test:access": "node --import tsx --test scripts/test-agent-access.ts scripts/test-oauth-consent.ts scripts/test-admin-access.ts scripts/test-admin-metrics.ts",

33 "test:knowledge": "node --import tsx --test scripts/test-knowledge.ts",

34 "benchmark:context": "node --import tsx scripts/benchmark-context.ts",

35 "test:discovery": "node --import tsx --test scripts/test-discovery.ts",

36 "test:discovery:database": "node --import tsx --test scripts/test-discovery-database.ts",

37 "verify:discovery:ui": "node scripts/discovery-ui-fixture.mjs"

38 },

39 "files": [

40 "bin/",

41 "dist/",

42 "scripts/postinstall.mjs",

43 "src/cli/",

44 "src/core/",

45 "src/lib/cache/",

46 "src/lib/discovery/",

47 "src/lib/database/",

48 "src/lib/mcp/",

49 "src/lib/storage/",

50 "src/lib/supabase/",

51 "src/lib/trash/",

bin/emdee.jsView file

Lines 1-22javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2import { Command } from "commander";

3import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

4import { existsSync } from "node:fs";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/emdee.jsView on unpkg · L2

dist/mcp/server.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/mcp/server.jsView on unpkg

18function adminClient() { L19: const key = process.env.SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY ?? process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY; L20: return createClient( ... L1114: const admin = adminClient(); L1115: const { data: direct } = await admin.from("doc_shares").select("id, share_root").eq("grantee_id", granteeId).eq("owner_id", ownerId).eq("path_prefix", relPath).eq("permission", "wr... L1116: if (direct && isWithinShareRootBoundary(relPath, direct.share_root)) return true; ... L1895: { "name": "get_image", "description": "Fetch an image from the vault and return it as a visual content block so you can see and analyze it. Use this to label images (patch_preamble... L1896: { "name": "upload_image", "description": "Upload an image (jpg/png/gif/webp/svg) as base64 to the vault. Creates a markdown doc tha

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/mcp/server.jsView on unpkg · L18

dist/cli/auth-commands.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1// src/cli/auth-commands.ts

2import { parseArgs } from "node:util";

3

4// src/cli/auth.ts

5import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";

6import { readFile, writeFile, mkdir, unlink, chmod, stat } from "node:fs/promises";

src/cli/auth.tsView file

Lines 1-32typescript

1// SPRINT-091: CLI auth — PKCE loopback OAuth against emdee.tech.

2//

3// Follows RFC 8252 (OAuth 2.0 for native apps) + dynamic client registration

4// via /oauth/register (matches Codex + Claude Code patterns already in use).

5// Credentials land in ~/.config/emdee/credentials.json at 0600.

6//

7// Token has a 30-day TTL and there is no refresh grant on the server today,

8// so credentials are simple: access_token + client_id + host + saved_at. When

9// a token expires, the CLI surfaces `run 'emdee login'` — same UX as Codex.

10

dist/cli/skills-install.jsView file

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: import { readdir, mkdir, copyfile, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; import { parseargs } from "node:util"; import path from "node:path"; import os from "node:os"; import { fileurltopath } from "node:url"; var default_target = path.join(os.homedir(), ".claude", "skills"); var pkg_root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileurltopath(import.meta.url)), "..", ".."); var skills_src = path.join(pkg_root, "skills"); async function copydirrecursive(srcdir, destdir) { await mkdir(destdir, { recursive: true }); const entries = await readdir(srcdir, { withfiletypes: true }); let count = 0; for (const entry of entries) { const srcpath = path.join(srcdir, entry.name); const destpath = path.join(destdir,

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/cli/skills-install.jsView on unpkg