@aisystemresources/emdee@0.24.9
Local-first document management with markdown rendering, knowledge graph, and MCP server.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall copy into Claude Code's skills directory is a concrete agent extension lifecycle risk and warrants a warning. The inspected authentication flow uses an OAuth code exchange with the configured host, and no separate attack chain was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package postinstall hook automatically invokes its bundled skill installer, unless an environment opt-out is set.
- The installer defaults to the user's Claude Code skills directory and copies package-supplied Markdown skill files there.
- The inspected bundled MCP server location lists Claude-related package files; it does not itself establish another configuration write.
- The inspected authentication code exchanges a user-authorized OAuth code with the configured service host; no credential forwarding to an unrelated recipient was established.
Source & flagged code
15 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aisystemresources/emdee@0.24.9.
See all versions of @aisystemresources/emdee for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @aisystemresources/emdee@0.24.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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