@aisystemresources/emdee@0.25.0
Local-first document management with markdown rendering, knowledge graph, and MCP server.
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms automatic, opt-out-only installation of package-owned Claude Code skills. This meets the warning category for first-party agent extension setup, but the reviewed behavior does not establish a concrete malicious attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest defines a postinstall script that runs the package’s installer.
- The postinstall script runs that installer unless an environment opt-out is set.
- The installer targets the user’s global Claude Code skills directory and copies package Markdown skills there.
- The requested location in the MCP bundle is embedded package metadata, not an agent settings mutation.
- The reviewed source establishes first-party skill setup, but does not establish credential theft, a reverse shell, or another concrete attack.
- The installer copies Markdown skill files; the reviewed code does not show it changing agent settings or enabling private-content export.
Source & flagged code
14 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aisystemresources/emdee@0.25.0.
See all versions of @aisystemresources/emdee for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @aisystemresources/emdee@0.25.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.