@aisystemresources/emdee@0.25.1
Local-first document management with markdown rendering, knowledge graph, and MCP server.
AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook automatically installs package-owned skills into the user’s Claude skills directory, which warrants a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected authentication flow does not substantiate the scanner’s credential exfiltration finding.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/postinstall.mjs during installation.
- The postinstall invokes the bundled skills installer unless EMDEE_SKIP_POSTINSTALL=1 or the bundle is absent.
- The installer copies package skill Markdown files into the user’s ~/.claude/skills directory.
- The login flow obtains a token from its configured host and stores that host with the token; whoami sends it to that same host.
- The inspected authentication flow does not send an existing unrelated session token to a separate recipient.
- The scanner’s credential warning is not supported by the inspected token exchange and whoami paths.
Source & flagged code
14 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aisystemresources/emdee@0.25.1.
See all versions of @aisystemresources/emdee for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @aisystemresources/emdee@0.25.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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