@aj-shadow/actorjs-app@0.0.0-aj-beta.267
Library used by @aj-shadow/actorjs
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe active postinstall performs destructive writes outside the package directory by deleting consumer project directories and replacing root-level paths. This concrete automatic behavior warrants blocking publication.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Installing the package through npm runs its postinstall hook.
Impact
Consumer project data and existing files or directories at those destinations can be lost or overwritten during installation.
Mechanism
The installer resolves paths above its package directory, recursively removes build, dist, and temp, then removes destinations and renames package contents into the consumer root.
Attack narrative
During npm installation, the postinstall hook runs npm-post-install.js. Its path calculations target the consumer project root: it recursively deletes build, dist, and temp, then removes destination paths and moves package content such as .vscode, project, and workspace into the root. This can destroy or replace consumer project data without a separate user action.
AI rationale
The active postinstall performs destructive writes outside the package directory by deleting consumer project directories and replacing root-level paths. This concrete automatic behavior warrants blocking publication.
Evidence
package.jsonnpm-post-install.jsconsumer-root buildconsumer-root distconsumer-root tempconsumer-root .vscodeconsumer-root projectconsumer-root workspace
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- package.json automatically loads npm-post-install.js during postinstall.
- The installer resolves project paths above the package directory and recursively deletes build, dist, and temp directories.
- The postinstall then removes consumer-root destinations and moves package files and directories into those locations, including .vscode, project, and workspace.
Evidence against
- The package contains no declared dependencies.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node -e "try{require('./npm[redacted]')}catch(e){console.log(e);}"
Critical
Red Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node -e "try{require('./npm[redacted]')}catch(e){console.log(e);}"
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgproject/server/plugin-data/repos/plugin_data_ReposVerifyGit.jsView file
3L4: const PluginBaseMulti = require('z-abs-corelayer-server/server/plugin-base-multi');
L5: const Os = require('os');
Medium
Dynamic Require
Findings
1 Critical3 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalRed Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedproject/server/plugin-data/test-suite/plugin_data_TestSuiteExecutionStart.js
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturenpm-post-install.js
MediumDynamic Requireproject/server/plugin-data/repos/plugin_data_ReposVerifyGit.js
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aj-shadow/actorjs-app@0.0.0-aj-beta.267.
See all versions of @aj-shadow/actorjs-app for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @aj-shadow/actorjs-app@0.0.0-aj-beta.267. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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