@alipay/ams-checkout@2.0.27
Use _AMS CHECKOUT_ as an ES module.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic findings reflect normal browser checkout networking and a generic loader, but source inspection found no concrete malicious behavior. The prepare hook is a VCS-hook setup command rather than an install-time attack chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The browser bundle contains a generic remote script loader.
- The manifest has a prepare hook that invokes Husky.
- The only lifecycle hook is prepare, not an automatic registry install hook, and it only runs Husky.
- Payment requests are made after the SDK request method is called and target configured checkout endpoints.
- The flagged data consists of browser and request context used by checkout, not local files, environment secrets, or credentials.
- No self-dependency, shell execution, persistence, destructive action, or AI-agent configuration mutation was found.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
ams-checkout.jsView on unpkg · L5Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
esm/util/logger.jsView on unpkg · L200Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @alipay/ams-checkout@2.0.27.
See all versions of @alipay/ams-checkout for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @alipay/ams-checkout@2.0.27 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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