@amedit/vercel-builder-probe@1.0.3

When wired in as a @vercel/build-utils Builder and the exported build() runs in a Vercel deployment pipeline, index.js reads the installer's RUNTIME_CACHE_HEADERS, VERCEL_DEPLOYMENT_KEY, and VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN environment variables and prints the raw JWTs and deployment key to the build log via console.log lines prefixed '[P1216]' (index.js:21-24). It then HMAC-signs a forged JWT using the installer's VERCEL_DEPLOYMENT_KEY (`crypto.createHmac('sha256', rawKey).update(header+'.'+payload).digest('base64url')`, index.js:41-44) and sends a request carrying that forged token to iad1.suspense-cache.vercel-infra.com with hardcoded team/project/deployment identifiers belonging to a third party. Installer harm is twofold: (1) the deployment key and cache JWT are written into Vercel build logs, where they may be retained, surfaced in CI artifacts, or shared; and (2) the installer's Vercel account is the one issuing a signature-forging request against Vercel's internal suspense-cache endpoint with another party's IDs, exposing the installer to abuse-policy enforcement. The '[P1216]' tag and hardcoded foreign deployment IDs indicate a research/abuse probe rather than a legitimate Builder. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e149c5b37214e25d4fd07a318603e2b499d5a89bbcecd17d7c03b46eb58b70aa) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.