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@androidand/specsync@0.13.0: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @androidand/specsync / 0.13.0

@androidand/specsync@0.13.0

Sync OpenSpec changes with work-tracker issues — standalone CLI

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. npm postinstall writes a bundled SKILL.md into Claude, Codex, OpenCode, Copilot, and generic .agents skill directories under the user home. That is unconsented mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces at install time.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install of @androidand/specsync, which runs the postinstall script automatically.

Impact

Installed coding agents can load the dropped skill and follow its specsync CLI instructions without the user opting in to agent setup.

Mechanism

unconsented install-time write of an AI agent skill into multiple foreign global skill directories

Policy narrative

Installing this package runs postinstall.js, which immediately copies skills/specsync/SKILL.md into five global agent skill folders under the home directory: Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Copilot, and .agents. It creates those folders if they are missing and writes the skill file with no prompt and no install flag. Errors are swallowed. After that, those agents can pick up the skill and run specsync commands. The skill itself even documents an explicit install-skill command, which this hook bypasses.

AI rationale

Automatic postinstall writes a skill file into multiple foreign global AI-agent directories, which matches unconsented install-time agent control-surface hijack. The GitHub binary download is checksummed and package-aligned, but it does not make the silent multi-agent skill install consented.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsskills/specsync/SKILL.md~/.claude/skills/specsync/SKILL.md

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

scripts/postinstall.jsView file

21// Install the specsync skill into every known global agent skill directory. L22: // Non-fatal: a missing ~/.claude or ~/.codex directory is normal. L23: function installSkill() { ... L27: const agentDirs = [ L28: path.join(os.homedir(), ".claude", "skills", "specsync"), L29: path.join(os.homedir(), ".codex", "skills", "specsync"), L30: path.join(os.homedir(), ".config", "opencode", "skills", "specsync"), L31: path.join(os.homedir(), ".copilot", "skills", "specsync"), L32: path.join(os.homedir(), ".agents", "skills", "specsync"), L33: ]; ... L37: try { L38: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

scripts/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L21

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @androidand/specsync@0.13.1 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFuZHJvaWRhbmQvc3BlY3N5bmM:0.13.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/postinstall.jsView on unpkg

bin/cli.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @androidand/specsync@0.13.1 matchedPath = bin/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFuZHJvaWRhbmQvc3BlY3N5bmM:0.13.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 0106c1bae732a49e signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @androidand/specsync@0.13.1 matchedPath = bin/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFuZHJvaWRhbmQvc3BlY3N5bmM:0.13.1 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 4 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg

scripts/installer.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @androidand/specsync@0.13.1 matchedPath = scripts/installer.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFuZHJvaWRhbmQvc3BlY3N5bmM:0.13.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/installer.jsView on unpkg