registry / Credential exfiltration / @anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth / 1.3.6

@anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth@1.3.6

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AI Security Review

scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The configurable endpoint permits authenticated requests to forward a Google access token to an unrestricted destination, which is a real conditional credential exposure risk. The default is package-aligned and no install-time attack was identified, so this warrants a warning rather than a publish block.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

A successful authenticated provider request can trigger background traffic; internal requests can also send the token to their request endpoint.

Impact

A custom endpoint can receive the account’s Google access token. The source does not establish that the default endpoint is unrelated or that the token is sent there by default.

Mechanism

The environment variable replaces the default Code Assist host, and requests use the access token as a Bearer credential without a destination allowlist.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/index.js

Network endpoints1

daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package exports dist/index.js as its runtime entrypoint.
OPENCODE_AGY_ENDPOINT can replace the default Google Code Assist host; no destination validation was found.
Authenticated runtime requests send the access token to that configured endpoint, and successful requests can trigger background calls that send the token there too.

Evidence against

The default endpoint is Google’s Code Assist service, consistent with the package’s OAuth provider purpose.
package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 791 KB of source, external domains: accounts.google.com, antigravity.google, cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com, daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, goo.gle, json-schema.org, models.dev, oauth2.googleapis.com, www.googleapis.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

133// src/plugin/oauth-authorize.ts L134: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L135:

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L133

118var AGY_CODE_ASSIST_ENDPOINT = process.env.OPENCODE_AGY_ENDPOINT || "https://daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com"; L119: var AGY_GENERATIVE_LANGUAGE_ENDPOINT = "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta"; L120: ... L122: function agyFetch(input, init) { L123: const proxy = process.env.OPENCODE_AGY_AUTH_PROXY; L124: if (!proxy) { ... L133: // src/plugin/oauth-authorize.ts L134: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L135:

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L118

29} L30: const data = readFileSync(cachePath, "utf-8"); L31: return JSON.parse(data); ... L133: // src/plugin/oauth-authorize.ts L134: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L135: ... L1252: } L1253: const baseUrl = `${AGY_CODE_ASSIST_ENDPOINT}/v1internal`; L1254: const onboardUrl = `${baseUrl}:onboardUser`;

Findings

3 High4 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumAi Review Evidencepackage.json

LowScripts Present

LowEval

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth@1.3.6.

See all versions of @anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth@1.3.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-15 19:37:59.565Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / Credential exfiltration / @anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth / 1.3.6

@anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth@1.3.6

AI Security Review

scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

A successful authenticated provider request can trigger background traffic; internal requests can also send the token to their request endpoint.

Impact

A custom endpoint can receive the account’s Google access token. The source does not establish that the default endpoint is unrelated or that the token is sent there by default.

Mechanism

The environment variable replaces the default Code Assist host, and requests use the access token as a Bearer credential without a destination allowlist.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/index.js

Network endpoints1

daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package exports dist/index.js as its runtime entrypoint.
OPENCODE_AGY_ENDPOINT can replace the default Google Code Assist host; no destination validation was found.
Authenticated runtime requests send the access token to that configured endpoint, and successful requests can trigger background calls that send the token there too.

Evidence against

The default endpoint is Google’s Code Assist service, consistent with the package’s OAuth provider purpose.
package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

133// src/plugin/oauth-authorize.ts L134: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L135:

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L133

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L118

Findings

3 High4 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumAi Review Evidencepackage.json

LowScripts Present

LowEval

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth@1.3.6.

See all versions of @anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @anthonyhaussman/opencode-agy-auth@1.3.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-15 19:37:59.565Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface