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@antoneeo/agentic-sdlc-skill@1.30.0: AI-agent control-surface | LPM Firewall

registry / @antoneeo/agentic-sdlc-skill / 1.30.0

@antoneeo/agentic-sdlc-skill@1.30.0

Documentation-First SDLC protocol for Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Google Antigravity and Codex with risk triage, Vision governance, installed support files and optional devPNT integration.

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installing the package automatically changes globally configured AI-agent skills. On detected Claude Code installations it also adds a user-level SessionStart command hook that invokes package code in later sessions.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm installation or update on a machine where a supported AI client is detected.

Impact

The package gains automatic influence over future AI-agent sessions outside the consuming project.

Mechanism

Postinstall copies skills and writes a persistent Claude SessionStart command hook.

Policy narrative

During npm postinstall, the package detects installed AI clients and copies its skill into their global configuration directories. If Claude Code is detected, it writes a user-level SessionStart hook that calls the package validator on subsequent agent sessions. This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface; uninstall cleanup does not remove the initial installation-time risk.

AI rationale

The package's automatic postinstall modifies global AI-agent configuration and establishes future command execution through Claude's SessionStart hook. This meets the install-hook abuse policy despite the absence of exfiltration or network activity.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsscripts/lib.jsskills/agentic-sdlc-skill~/.claude/skills/agentic-sdlc~/.gemini/skills/agentic-sdlc~/.codex/skills/agentic-sdlc

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

scripts/lib.jsView file

15Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L74: cmd: 'claude', L75: home: process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR || path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude'), L76: envVar: 'CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR', ... L90: cmd: 'codex', L91: home: process.env.CODEX_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.codex'), L92: envVar: 'CODEX_HOME', ... L146: function copyRecursive(src, dest) { L147: if (typeof fs.cpSync === 'function') { L148: fs.cpSync(src, dest, { recursive: true, force: true }); L149: return; ... L151: // Fallback for Node < 16.7 L152: if (!fs.existsSync(dest)) fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true }); Write operation from scripts/postinstall.js: L15: try { L16: fs.mkdirSync(target, { recursive: true }); L17: copyRecursive(SKILL_SOURCE, target); Foreign user/project scope from scripts/lib.js: L

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

scripts/lib.jsView on unpkg · L15

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.10.0 matchedPath = scripts/lib.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/lib.jsView on unpkg

skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/scripts/sdlc_check.pyView file

•path = skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/scripts/sdlc_check.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3084 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/scripts/sdlc_check.pyView on unpkg

scripts/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/init.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @antoneeo/agentic-sdlc-skill@1.33.0 matchedPath = scripts/init.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.33.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/init.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = a35dbc2f627d919c signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @antoneeo/kb-agentic-skill@1.16.0 matchedPath = scripts/init.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.16.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 4 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

scripts/init.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 4-44json

4 "description": "Documentation-First SDLC protocol for Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Google Antigravity and Codex with risk triage, Vision governance, installed support files and optional devPNT integration.",

5 "keywords": [

6 "claude-code",

7 "claude-skill",

8 "gemini-cli",

9 "skill",

10 "sdlc",

11 "documentation",

12 "ai-agent"

13 ],

14 "author": "Antonio Pinto (https://github.com/Antoneeo)",

15 "license": "MIT",

16 "publishConfig": {

17 "access": "public"

18 },

19 "bin": {

20 "agentic-sdlc-init": "scripts/init.js",

21 "agentic-sdlc-install-skill": "scripts/postinstall.js"

22 },

23 "scripts": {

24 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L24

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L24

25 "preuninstall": "node scripts/preuninstall.js"

26 },

27 "files": [

28 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/SKILL.md",

29 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/templates.md",

30 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/architect.md",

31 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/guides.md",

32 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/vision.md",

33 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/tdd.md",

34 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/debugging.md",

35 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/elicitation.md",

36 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/review.md",

37 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/dispatch.md",

38 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/routing.md",

39 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/ENFORCEMENT.md",

40 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/scripts/sdlc_check.py",

41 "skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/scripts/sdlc_core.py",

42 "gemini-extension.json",

43 "README.md",

44 "CHANGELOG.md",

scripts/lib.jsView file

Lines 1-35javascript

1// Shared helpers for the Agentic SDLC npm scripts (init / postinstall / preuninstall).

2// Single source for client detection and skill-target paths: init and postinstall

3// must never disagree on what "Claude Code is installed" means.

4

5const fs = require('fs');

6const path = require

skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/scripts/sdlc_check.pyView file

•path = skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/scripts/sdlc_check.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3084 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/agentic-sdlc-skill/scripts/sdlc_check.pyView on unpkg

scripts/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/init.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @antoneeo/agentic-sdlc-skill@1.33.0 matchedPath = scripts/init.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.33.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/init.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = a35dbc2f627d919c signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @antoneeo/kb-agentic-skill@1.16.0 matchedPath = scripts/init.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.16.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 4 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

scripts/init.jsView on unpkg