---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@antoneeo/course-creator/v/0.1.0-beta.3"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@antoneeo/course-creator/v/0.1.0-beta.3.md"
package: "@antoneeo/course-creator"
report_status: "published"
title: "@antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.1.0-beta.3"
---

# @antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.1.0-beta.3
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The postinstall performs first-party agent skill setup and can modify Claude’s user-level hook settings, creating residual lifecycle risk. The inspected code does not establish a concrete attack, so this is a warning rather than a block.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-17T02:38:42.052Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-17T02:39:19.071Z
- **Download time:** 774 ms
- **Static scan time:** 159 ms
- **AI review time:** 36085 ms
- **Total time:** 37019 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Installation automatically places the package’s skill in detected agent user directories and can add a Claude session-start hook. This is first-party agent setup with residual lifecycle risk; the inspected code does not establish an attack.

- **Trigger:** The package’s postinstall lifecycle runs during installation or update when a supported agent client is detected.

- **Impact:** The installed skill and hook become available to the agent without a separate setup command; no credential disclosure or other concrete attack effect was found.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/lib.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-17T02:39:19.071Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The installer copies the package-owned skill and, for Claude, registers a local orientation command in user-level settings unless the opt-out marker is present.

- **Rationale:** The postinstall performs first-party agent skill setup and can modify Claude’s user-level hook settings, creating residual lifecycle risk. The inspected code does not establish a concrete attack, so this is a warning rather than a block.

- **Files touched:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/lib.js

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 88.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** package.json runs scripts/postinstall.js after installation., The postinstall detects agent clients and installs this package’s own skill; for Claude it also calls the global hook setup., The initializer writes agent instruction files only when the initializer is run; the Claude configuration directory can be selected through an environment variable., The hook setup targets Claude’s user-level settings file and registers a SessionStart command, unless its opt-out marker is present., The skill installer leaves an existing unowned target alone.

- **Evidence against:** The inspected setup points to a local orientation command; no credential transfer, remote endpoint, destructive action, or unrelated agent setting change was identified.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3.

- Review the evidence and your use of @antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/lib.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3/scripts/lib.js>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L75: cmd: 'claude',
L76: home: process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR || path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude'),
L77: envVar: 'CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR',
...
L91: cmd: 'codex',
L92: home: process.env.CODEX_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.codex'),
L93: envVar: 'CODEX_HOME',
...
L133: function copyRecursive(src, dest) {
L134: if (typeof fs.cpSync === 'function') {
L135: fs.cpSync(src, dest, { recursive: true, force: true });
L136: return;
L137: }
L138: if (!fs.existsSync(dest)) fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true });
```

### 8. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** scripts/init.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3/scripts/init.js>)

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
md', `---\ndescription: project benefit and boundaries.\nstatus: draft\n---\n# project vision\nstatus: draft\n\n## expected benefit\n<discuss with the owner.>\n`],
  ['ai_docs/vision/roadmap.md', `---\ndescription: project learning and delivery roadmap.\nstatus: draft\n---\n# roadmap\nstatus: draft\n`],
  ['ai_docs/vision/principles.md', `---\ndescription: decisions that constrain project work.\nstatus: draft\n---\n# principles\nstatus: draft\n`],
  ['ai_docs/strategic/architecture.md', `---\ndescription: verified component inventory.\nstatus: current\n---\n# architecture\n\n## component map\n| component | capability it owns | contract | where |\n|---|---|---|---|\n\n## archi
```

### 9. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** skills/course-creator/scripts/sdlc\_check.py
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3/skills/course-creator/scripts/sdlc_check.py>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```python
path = skills/course-creator/scripts/sdlc_check.py
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 3303
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 10. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 11. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** scripts/lib.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3/scripts/lib.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
```

### 12. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 88.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@antoneeo/course-creator@0.1.0-beta.3/package.json>)

package.json runs scripts/postinstall.js after installation.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
"scripts": {
    "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js",
    "preuninstall": "no
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, preuninstall
- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @antoneeo/course-creator
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.1.0-beta.3
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-10-13T04:54:57.741Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-10-17T02:39:19.071Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-20T01:51:08.790Z
- **Known versions:** 15
- **Latest version:** 0.1.0-beta.23
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Design sourced, progressive courses for a defined learner with Agentic SDLC governance and diagnostic learner simulations.
- **Author:** Antonio Pinto
- **Maintainers:** antoneeo
- **Keywords:** claude-code, gemini-cli, codex, course-design, skill, ai-agent
- **Artifact files:** 34
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 523,164 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@antoneeo/course-creator/v/0.1.0-beta.3>)
