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@antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.10.0: AI-agent control-surface | LPM Firewall

registry / @antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill / 0.10.0

@antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.10.0

Evidence-First marketing planning protocol for Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Google Antigravity and Codex: engagement triage, SOSTAC workflow, evidence ledger, mechanical validator and optional devPNT integration.

AI Security Review

scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installing the package can alter global AI-agent skill directories and Claude user settings without an interactive choice. It persists a SessionStart command hook that later runs the installed validator.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm postinstall when a supported AI client is detected and Python is available

Impact

Future Claude sessions can automatically execute package-controlled code, and supported agent clients receive global package content.

Mechanism

Global skill installation and user-level SessionStart hook injection

Policy narrative

The postinstall lifecycle script detects AI clients, copies the package skill into their global directories, and for Claude calls a helper that adds a command-type SessionStart hook to the user-level settings file. The hook invokes the package-installed Python validator on later agent sessions. This is automatic mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface; the package explicitly performs it without asking during installation.

AI rationale

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that modifies global AI-agent configuration and establishes future command execution. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-hijack boundary even though no exfiltration or network behavior was found.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsscripts/lib.js~/.claude/settings.json~/.claude/skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc~/.gemini/skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

scripts/lib.jsView file

15Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L80: cmd: 'claude', L81: home: process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR || path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude'), L82: envVar: 'CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR', ... L96: cmd: 'codex', L97: home: process.env.CODEX_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.codex'), L98: envVar: 'CODEX_HOME', ... L152: function copyRecursive(src, dest) { L153: if (typeof fs.cpSync === 'function') { L154: fs.cpSync(src, dest, { recursive: true, force: true }); L155: return; ... L157: // Fallback for Node < 16.7 L158: if (!fs.existsSync(dest)) fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true }); Write operation from scripts/postinstall.js: L15: try { L16: fs.mkdirSync(target, { recursive: true }); L17: copyRecursive(SKILL_SOURCE, target); Foreign user/project scope from scripts/lib.js: L

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

scripts/lib.jsView on unpkg · L15

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.11.0 matchedPath = scripts/lib.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.11.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/lib.jsView on unpkg

skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.pyView file

•path = skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 113913 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.pyView on unpkg

scripts/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/init.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.11.0 matchedPath = scripts/init.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.11.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/init.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 647a0f91dce1f7a8 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.11.0 matchedPath = scripts/init.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.11.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 4 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

scripts/init.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 5-45json

5 "keywords": [

6 "claude-code",

7 "claude-skill",

8 "gemini-cli",

9 "skill",

10 "marketing",

11 "marketing-plan",

12 "sostac",

13 "ai-agent"

14 ],

15 "author": "Antonio Pinto (https://github.com/Antoneeo)",

16 "license": "MIT",

17 "publishConfig": {

18 "access": "public"

19 },

20 "bin": {

21 "mkt-sdlc-init": "scripts/init.js",

22 "mkt-sdlc-install-skill": "scripts/postinstall.js"

23 },

24 "scripts": {

25 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L25

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L25

26 "preuninstall": "node scripts/preuninstall.js"

27 },

28 "files": [

29 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/SKILL.md",

30 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/frameworks.md",

31 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/elicitation.md",

32 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/research.md",

33 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/templates.md",

34 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/review.md",

35 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.py",

36 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/routing.md",

37 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/guides.md",

38 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/vision.md",

39 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/dispatch.md",

40 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/ENFORCEMENT.md",

41 "skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/mkt_check.py",

42 "gemini-extension.json",

43 "README.md",

44 "CHANGELOG.md",

45 "scripts/lib.js",

scripts/lib.jsView file

Lines 1-35javascript

1// Shared helpers for the Marketing Agentic SDLC npm scripts (init / postinstall / preuninstall).

2// Single source for client detection and skill-target paths: init and postinstall

3// must never disagree on what "Claude Code is installed" means.

4

5const fs = require('fs');

6const path =

skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.pyView file

•path = skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 113913 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.pyView on unpkg

scripts/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/init.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/init.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.11.0 matchedPath = scripts/init.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.11.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/init.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 647a0f91dce1f7a8 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.11.0 matchedPath = scripts/init.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.11.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 4 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

scripts/init.jsView on unpkg