@apilift/cli@1.4.22
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install hook or confirmed attack behavior. Scanner concerns are consistent with the package’s configured service calls, local helper, and user-invoked session audit.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json maps the published commands to CLI entrypoints and declares no install lifecycle hook.
- The collector reads Codex and Claude session files from their configured local directories; the indicated code does not write agent configuration.
- The indicated session-audit location is part of a string table, not an agent configuration mutation.
- The CLI defaults to the Apilift service and restricts its URL to HTTP or HTTPS origins.
- The API client adds a bearer token to requests made through its configured client; the inspected source does not show redirection to an unrelated gateway.
- The session-audit command writes a local HTML or JSON report when invoked.
- The native host starts a local helper script supplied by its options.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/apilift.jsView on unpkg · L30805Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/apilift.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @apilift/cli@1.4.22.
See all versions of @apilift/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @apilift/cli@1.4.22 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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