registry / @apilift/cli / 1.4.29
@apilift/cli@1.4.29
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection did not confirm the scanner's credential-redirection claim: the CLI's API client uses the configured Apilift service, and the flagged agent locations do not establish agent configuration mutation. The available evidence supports normal CLI, local helper, and telemetry behavior rather than malicious activity.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user runs an exposed CLI command; the collector is started by CLI code.
Impact
The inspected evidence does not establish credential theft, unauthorized account actions, or agent control hijacking.
Mechanism
The API client sends requests to the configured service, defaulting to apilift.dev. The flagged agent locations identify session paths and tokenizer strings rather than writing agent settings.
AI rationale
Static inspection did not confirm the scanner's credential-redirection claim: the CLI's API client uses the configured Apilift service, and the flagged agent locations do not establish agent configuration mutation. The available evidence supports normal CLI, local helper, and telemetry behavior rather than malicious activity.
Evidence
package.jsondist/apilift.jsdist/apilift-collector.jsdist/apilift-session-audit.jsdist/apilift-native-host.jsdist/apilift-capture-server.js
Network endpoints3
apilift.deveu.i.posthog.com127.0.0.1
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes four CLI entrypoints and defines build, typecheck, and test scripts, with no install lifecycle hook.
- The CLI defaults to the Apilift service and uses that configured site for its API client.
- The API client attaches its token to requests made through the client; the inspected code does not establish a redirect to an unrelated recipient.
- The collector is launched from CLI code and uses the PostHog EU endpoint; the cited agent-integration locations concern session paths and tokenizer strings, not agent configuration writes.
- The capture server checks a bearer token on incoming local requests.
Evidence against
- No source evidence confirmed the scanner's claimed fixed unofficial credential gateway or persistent credential redirection.
- The two indicated agent-integration locations do not show mutation of agent settings or installation of an extension.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/apilift.jsView file
31118// src/process.ts
L31119: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L31120: function backgroundOptions(env, platform4 = process.platform) {
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/apilift.jsView on unpkg · L31118•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/apilift.js:
transportDefinitionSchema = external_exports.strictObject({ title, description: requiredDescription, mode: external_exports.enum(["direct", "browser"]), baseUrl: requestUrlSchema.o...
if (v.mode === "direct" && !v.baseUrl)
ctx.addIssue({ code: "custom", path: ["baseUrl"], message: "Direct transport requires baseUrl" });
if (v.baseUrl && !v.allowedOrigins.includes(parseUrl(v.baseUrl)?.origin ?? ""))
ctx.addIssue({ code: "custom", path: ["baseUrl"], message: "Base URL origin must be allowed" });
const keys = kind === "transport" ? ["mode", "baseUrl", "allowedOrigins", "browserContext", "credentials", "inject", "probes"]
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/apilift.jsView on unpkg51Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/apilift.js spawns dist/apilift-capture-server.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L51: attachSchema: () => attachSchema,
L52: base64ToUint8Array: () => base64ToUint8Array,
L53: base64urlToUint8Array: () => base64urlToUint8Array,
...
L1292: }
L1293: return result3.issues.length ? failure(_Err, result3.issues, ctx) : { success: true, data: result3.value };
L1294: };
...
L2163: return false;
L2164: return canParseURL(`http://[${value}]`);
L2165: }
...
L4531: }
L4532: function isRecursive(inst, stack, resolve6) {
L4533: const cached2 = recursive.get(inst);
Findings
1 Critical3 High2 Medium7 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/apilift-capture-server.js
HighChild Processdist/apilift.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/apilift.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/apilift.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/apilift.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @apilift/cli@1.4.29.
See all versions of @apilift/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @apilift/cli@1.4.29 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.