registry / @apilift/cli / 1.4.31
@apilift/cli@1.4.31
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install hook or unconsented credential transfer to an unrelated recipient. The flagged agent and execution signals resolve to explicit setup, session analysis, filtered telemetry, and a local authenticated browser helper.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user invokes CLI commands; setup and agent integration require explicit CLI commands.
Impact
No harmful effect was established; setup links the installation to the Apilift service, and the inspected session tools produce local reports and usage records.
Mechanism
The CLI contacts its configured Apilift service, conditionally sends filtered telemetry, and runs a token-protected capture server on loopback.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no install hook or unconsented credential transfer to an unrelated recipient. The flagged agent and execution signals resolve to explicit setup, session analysis, filtered telemetry, and a local authenticated browser helper.
Network endpoints3
apilift.deveu.i.posthog.com127.0.0.1
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes CLI entrypoints and lists build, typecheck, and test scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- Setup directs the user to sign in and provide a one-time code, sends it to the configured Apilift service, and saves the returned installation token locally.
- Session lookup is scoped to agent session locations; the flagged audit location is a token-list fragment, while the audit command requires a caller-supplied session and writes a report.
- Telemetry filters event properties through an allowlist and uploads only with an enabled identity restricted to the configured collector host.
- The native host checks its registered browser caller, and the local capture server binds to loopback and requires a bearer token.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscation
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/apilift.jsView file
31118// src/process.ts
L31119: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L31120: function backgroundOptions(env, platform4 = process.platform) {
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/apilift.jsView on unpkg · L31118•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/apilift.js:
transportDefinitionSchema = external_exports.strictObject({ title, description: requiredDescription, mode: external_exports.enum(["direct", "browser"]), baseUrl: requestUrlSchema.o...
if (v.mode === "direct" && !v.baseUrl)
ctx.addIssue({ code: "custom", path: ["baseUrl"], message: "Direct transport requires baseUrl" });
if (v.baseUrl && !v.allowedOrigins.includes(parseUrl(v.baseUrl)?.origin ?? ""))
ctx.addIssue({ code: "custom", path: ["baseUrl"], message: "Base URL origin must be allowed" });
const keys = kind === "transport" ? ["mode", "baseUrl", "allowedOrigins", "browserContext", "credentials", "inject", "probes"]
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/apilift.jsView on unpkg51Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/apilift.js spawns dist/apilift-capture-server.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L51: attachSchema: () => attachSchema,
L52: base64ToUint8Array: () => base64ToUint8Array,
L53: base64urlToUint8Array: () => base64urlToUint8Array,
...
L1292: }
L1293: return result3.issues.length ? failure(_Err, result3.issues, ctx) : { success: true, data: result3.value };
L1294: };
...
L2163: return false;
L2164: return canParseURL(`http://[${value}]`);
L2165: }
...
L4531: }
L4532: function isRecursive(inst, stack, resolve6) {
L4533: const cached2 = recursive.get(inst);
Findings
1 Critical3 High2 Medium7 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/apilift-capture-server.js
HighChild Processdist/apilift.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/apilift.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/apilift.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/apilift.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @apilift/cli@1.4.31.
See all versions of @apilift/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @apilift/cli@1.4.31 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.