@apilift/cli@1.4.37
AI Security Review
scanned 23d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe collector uses the package’s service by default, but APILIFT_URL accepts any HTTP or HTTPS origin and the collector reuses the stored installation token there. Because the CLI starts the collector after a user command and the API client sends the token as a bearer credential, a non-Apilift override can expose it; the source does not establish malicious intent.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- After a CLI command, the package starts a background collector that loads the stored installation and uses its token for API requests.
- The API client sends its supplied token as a bearer credential; APILIFT_URL accepts any HTTP or HTTPS origin, with https://apilift.dev as the default.
- The collector builds pseudonymous usage measurements and submits them through the API client.
- The collector’s agent integration locates local session files and opens Codex state databases read-only.
- The required session-audit location contains vocabulary data, not an agent configuration write.
- The dynamic Function call compiles schema validation code; the capture server binds to loopback and parses JSON requests.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/apilift.jsView on unpkg · L31202Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @apilift/cli@1.4.37.
See all versions of @apilift/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @apilift/cli@1.4.37 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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