@apilift/cli@1.5.15
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s evaluation findings resolve to a fixed local process-owner helper and bundled library code; I found no remote-response execution path. Credential forwarding is constrained to selected app transports and allowed HTTPS origins, while analytics is gated by account-provided settings.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes four CLI entrypoints and lists build, typecheck, and test scripts; no install hook was identified.
- The CLI defaults to the Apilift service and accepts an HTTP or HTTPS endpoint override.
- Saved credentials are read for the selected app transport, and requests are restricted to that transport’s allowed origins; credential origins require HTTPS.
- The reported evaluation marker runs a fixed local process-owner helper; its script checks process start times.
- Analytics uses an account-provided enablement setting, an EU PostHog host, and filtered command events; the background collector sends usage measurements through the Apilift service.
- The inspected required paths correspond to native-host and audit utilities, a keyring binding, a model-price catalog, and a schema validator.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @apilift/cli@1.5.15.
See all versions of @apilift/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @apilift/cli@1.5.15 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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