@apilift/cli@1.5.2
AI Security Review
scanned 18d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI permits an unrestricted HTTP or HTTPS API origin and sends its saved installation token to that destination during ordinary commands. This is a conditional credential-exposure risk, while the reviewed agent-session and process-inspection signals do not establish a separate attack.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs a linked CLI command while APILIFT_URL points to another HTTP or HTTPS origin.
Impact
The configured recipient can receive an Apilift installation token. The source does not establish malicious collection or subsequent misuse.
Mechanism
The CLI attaches the saved token as a bearer credential and sends the API request using the configured base URL. The inspected path has no host allowlist or recipient-specific confirmation.
AI rationale
The CLI permits an unrestricted HTTP or HTTPS API origin and sends its saved installation token to that destination during ordinary commands. This is a conditional credential-exposure risk, while the reviewed agent-session and process-inspection signals do not establish a separate attack.
Evidence
dist/apilift.js
Network endpoints1
apilift.dev
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 96.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- Linking saves the Apilift installation token locally, and ordinary commands pass the saved token to the API client.
- The client sends the token as a bearer credential; APILIFT_URL accepts any HTTP or HTTPS origin and supplies the client’s base URL.
- The flagged collector code locates local Codex and Claude session directories. The session-audit target is a tokenizer string fragment; its relevant code reads transcripts and writes an audit report.
- The manifest exposes CLI entrypoints. The inspected native-host and capture-server behaviors align with reading a configured extension origin and checking a local process start time.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationTelemetryUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/apilift.jsView file
76const {workerData}=require('node:worker_threads');
L77: const {spawn}=require('node:child_process');
L78: const state=new Int32Array(workerData.memory,0,4), value=new Float64Array(workerData.memory,16,1);
High
23778sourceCode = this.opts.code.process(sourceCode, sch);
L23779: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode);
L23780: const validate2 = makeValidate(this, this.scope.get());
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/apilift.js:
script = `$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'; while ($null -ne ($line=[Console]::ReadLine())) { $parts=$line.Split('|'); try { $p=[System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById([int]$part...
import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync2, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
writeFileSync(join(directory, "owner.json"), JSON.stringify(owner), { flag: "wx", mode: 384 });
transportDefinitionSchema = external_exports.strictObject({ title, description: requiredDescription, mode: external_exports.enum(["direct", "browser"]), baseUrl: requestUrlSchema.o...
if (v.mode === "direct" && !v.baseUrl)
ctx.addIssue({ cod
Findings
1 Critical4 High3 Medium6 Low
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/apilift-capture-server.js
HighChild Processdist/apilift.js
HighEvaldist/apilift.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/apilift.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/apilift.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @apilift/cli@1.5.2.
See all versions of @apilift/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @apilift/cli@1.5.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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