@apilift/cli@1.6.1
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI permits an unrestricted API-origin override while attaching its saved installation token to requests, creating conditional credential exposure. This supports a warning, but the inspected source does not establish a hidden recipient or an attack when the default service is used.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has no install lifecycle hook; its listed scripts are build, typecheck, and tests.
- APILIFT_URL can select any HTTP or HTTPS origin; the default is https://apilift.dev.
- The setup flow stores the installation token returned when linking the CLI.
- Later CLI requests use the saved token as a Bearer credential with the selected site as their base URL.
- The separate analytics path accepts only the configured EU PostHog host and a project key with the expected format.
- The source does not establish a fixed unofficial credential recipient or credential theft; exposure depends on an operator setting APILIFT_URL to an untrusted origin.
- The capture server requires a Bearer token and binds to 127.0.0.1; its remote-code-execution hint was not confirmed.
- The package includes ordinary CLI, native-host, session-audit, and pricing-library functionality.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @apilift/cli@1.6.1.
See all versions of @apilift/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @apilift/cli@1.6.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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