@apilift/cli@1.8.0
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source does not substantiate the scanner’s credential-redirection or remote-code-execution findings: Apilift credentials are used by the configured service client, saved app credentials are encrypted locally, and the capture-server worker runs a fixed Windows helper. The package also has no install hook; its analytics endpoint and enablement are constrained by the service-provided identity.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes CLI binaries and build/test scripts; it declares no install lifecycle hook.
- The CLI defaults to https://apilift.dev and permits a user-configured APILIFT_URL for its service endpoint.
- The client sends its Apilift bearer token through the configured API client.
- Saved credential fields are encrypted with AES-256-GCM before database storage, with the encryption key kept in the vault.
- The flagged capture-server worker runs a fixed PowerShell process-inspection script; its dynamic worker source does not come from a remote response.
- Analytics is enabled only when the service identity enables it and specifies the expected PostHog host and project-key format.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @apilift/cli@1.8.0.
See all versions of @apilift/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @apilift/cli@1.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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