---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@askexenow/exe-os/v/0.9.381"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@askexenow/exe-os/v/0.9.381.md"
package: "@askexenow/exe-os"
report_status: "published"
title: "@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381 npm security report"
verdict: "policy_finding"
version: "0.9.381"
---

# @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. A package install can persist code execution in the user's AI-agent control surface and observe or affect later agent activity.

- **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured
- **Firewall policy:** Warn by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface
- **Selected version:** 0.9.381
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installation automatically modifies Claude's global skills, MCP, and hook configuration when package setup state exists. The resulting hooks execute package code after broad agent tool events.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-08T09:11:18.468Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-08T09:12:33.574Z
- **Download time:** 757 ms
- **Static scan time:** 14460 ms
- **AI review time:** 59887 ms
- **Total time:** 75106 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Installation automatically modifies Claude's global skills, MCP, and hook configuration when package setup state exists. The resulting hooks execute package code after broad agent tool events.

- **Trigger:** npm installation or update on a host with existing exe-os setup state.

- **Impact:** A package install can persist code execution in the user's AI-agent control surface and observe or affect later agent activity.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, postinstall.mjs, dist/bin/install.js, dist/chunk-EQWKSGBY.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-08T09:12:33.574Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Postinstall registration of Claude skills, MCP configuration, and event hooks.

- **Attack narrative:** The package's postinstall invokes its installer automatically. After detecting prior setup state, that installer copies skills into the global Claude directory, writes an MCP entry to the user's Claude configuration, and installs commands triggered by broad tool events. This creates persistent execution of package-controlled hook code during later agent sessions without an explicit setup command at the time of installation or update.

- **Rationale:** The automatic lifecycle hook modifies a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface and installs code triggered by normal agent activity. The setup-state guard does not provide contemporaneous user consent for package updates.

- **Files touched:** postinstall.mjs, dist/bin/install.js, dist/chunk-EQWKSGBY.js, src/commands/exe, ~/.claude/skills, ~/.claude.json, ~/.claude/settings.json, dist/hooks/post-tool-combined.js

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for policy risk:** The npm postinstall hook automatically launches the package installer., The installer copies package commands into the user's Claude skills directory., On hosts with prior setup state, postinstall registers an MCP server and hooks without an explicit user command., The hooks run package code after broad Claude tool events, including read, write, shell, agent, and MCP activity.

- **Evidence against:** The automatic global registration is gated on prior package setup state and a canonical install path., No self-dependency or outbound exfiltration endpoint was established in the inspected install path.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381.

- Avoid installing @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.mjs
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.mjs
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/chunk-MAOKR5AL.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/chunk-MAOKR5AL.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L37: import { chmodSync, existsSync as existsSync4, statSync, copyFileSync, unlinkSync as unlinkSync4, openSync as openSync3, closeSync as closeSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync2, renameSyn...
L38: import { execFile, spawnSync } from "child_process";
L39: import { createClient } from "@libsql/client";
```

### 6. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** postinstall.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/postinstall.mjs>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L8: *
L9: * npm runs lifecycle scripts through `cmd.exe` on Windows, which has no `[`
L10: * test builtin and no `true`. Every Windows user therefore saw
```

### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/chunk-PAETAECN.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/chunk-PAETAECN.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L71: const dreamingPath = "./dreaming.js";
L72: const dreaming = await import(
L73: /* @vite-ignore */
```

### 8. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 9. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 10. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/chunk-5V7BD7Z4.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/chunk-5V7BD7Z4.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L12: import { chmodSync, chownSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, readdirSync } from "fs";
L13: import { execSync } from "child_process";
L14: import path from "path";
...
L221: function [redacted](opts = {}) {
L222: const platformName = opts.platform ?? process.platform;
L223: if (platformName !== "darwin") {
...
L232: }
L233: const env = opts.env ?? process.env;
L234: const targetUser = env.SUDO_USER && env.SUDO_USER !== "root" ? env.SUDO_USER : "";
...
L348: try {
L349: execSync(`launchctl bootout gui/${targetUid}/${label} 2>/dev/null`, { timeout: 5e3 });
L350: } catch {
```

### 11. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 12. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/lib/exe-daemon.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/lib/exe-daemon.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L195: import os4 from "os";
L196: import net from "net";
L197: import v8 from "v8";
...
L201: import { access, appendFile, mkdir, readdir, readFile, rename, stat, unlink, writeFile } from "fs/promises";
L202: import { execSync as execSyncNode, execFile as execFileNode } from "child_process";
L203: import { promisify } from "util";
...
L206: var NPM_ROOT_RETRY_MS = (() => {
L207: const raw = process.env.EXE_NPM_ROOT_RETRY_MS;
L208: const n = raw !== void 0 ? Number(raw) : NaN;
```

### 13. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/lib/exe-daemon.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/lib/exe-daemon.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L195: import os4 from "os";
L196: import net from "net";
L197: import v8 from "v8";
...
L201: import { access, appendFile, mkdir, readdir, readFile, rename, stat, unlink, writeFile } from "fs/promises";
L202: import { execSync as execSyncNode, execFile as execFileNode } from "child_process";
L203: import { promisify } from "util";
...
L210: })();
L211: function [redacted](execFile, log = (m) => void process.stderr.write(m), opts = {}) {
L212: const retryMs = opts.retryMs ?? NPM_ROOT_RETRY_MS;
```

### 14. Critical: Download Execute
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/install.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/install.js>)

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L249: import { existsSync, openSync, closeSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, statSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, readdirSync } from "fs";
L250: import { spawn, execSync } from "child_process";
L251: import path from "path";
L252: import os from "os";
L253: var homedir = os.homedir;
L254: function exeDir() {
...
L266: try {
L267: const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path.join(pkgRoot, "package.json"), "utf8"));
L268: return pkg.version;
...
L287: versionMismatchWarned = true;
L288: process.stderr.write(
L289: `exe-os: daemon/client version mismatch (daemon ${daemonVersion}, client ${clientVersion}). Run: exe-os-install --global
```

### 15. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/installer-OMXHKOUV.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/installer-OMXHKOUV.js>)

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
import {
  resolvepackageroot
} from "./chunk-eqwksgby.js";
import {
  loadpreferences
} from "./chunk-xbolfvmd.js";
import {
  exe_hooks,
  islegacysplitposttoolcommand
} from "./chunk-km6xsfhp.js";
import {
  buildmcphttpheaders,
  mcphttpurl
} from "./chunk-2p5b4pmy.js";
import "./chunk-b6ti3tzt.js";
import "./chunk-tktefyph.js";
import "./chunk-k4esaspl.js";
import "./chunk-a2hkhdvo.js";
import "./chunk-cvyc6duw.js";
import "./chunk-hyzv25ly.js";
import "./chunk-gjv3wdwm.js";
import "./chunk-maokr5al.js";
import "./chunk-bbmtvae3.js";
import "./chunk-tkditwdn.js";
import "./chunk-5yeupuv4.js";
import "./chunk-goddbypl.js";
import "./chunk-yyb5pmtk.js";
import "./chunk-l5cgxe
```

### 16. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/deferred-daemon-restart.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/deferred-daemon-restart.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/bin/deferred-daemon-restart.js spawns dist/chunk-3OEVDGIY.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L206: import { existsSync, openSync, closeSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
L207: import { spawn, execSync } from "child_process";
L208: import path from "path";
...
L221: try {
L222: const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path.join(pkgRoot, "package.json"), "utf8"));
L223: return pkg.version;
...
L242: versionMismatchWarned = true;
L243: process.stderr.write(
L244: `[deferred-restart] daemon/client version mismatch (daemon ${daemonVersion}, client ${clientVersion}). Run: exe-os-install --global
...
L250: const result2 = await new Promise((resolve) => {
L251: const req = http.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${daemonPor
```

### 17. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/install.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/install.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/bin/install.js
L249: import { existsSync, openSync, closeSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, statSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, readdirSync } from "fs";
L250: import { spawn, execSync } from "child_process";
L251: import path from "path";
L252: import os from "os";
L253: var homedir = os.homedir;
L254: function exeDir() {
...
L266: try {
L267: const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path.join(pkgRoot, "package.json"), "utf8"));
L268: return pkg.version;
...
L287: versionMismatchWarned = true;
L288: process.stderr.write(
L289: `exe-os: daemon/client version mismatch (daemon ${daemonVersion}, client ${clientVersion}). Run: exe-os-install --global
```

### 18. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/lib/exe-daemon.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/lib/exe-daemon.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.exports -> dist/mcp/server.js -> dist/chunk-GKK7SSUW.js -> dist/lib/exe-daemon.js
L195: import os4 from "os";
L196: import net from "net";
L197: import v8 from "v8";
...
L201: import { access, appendFile, mkdir, readdir, readFile, rename, stat, unlink, writeFile } from "fs/promises";
L202: import { execSync as execSyncNode, execFile as execFileNode } from "child_process";
L203: import { promisify } from "util";
...
L210: })();
L211: function [redacted](execFile, log = (m) => void process.stderr.write(m), opts = {}) {
L212: const retryMs = opts.retryMs ?? NPM_ROOT_RETRY_MS;
```

### 19. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/install.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/install.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/bin/install.js
L249: import { existsSync, openSync, closeSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, statSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, readdirSync } from "fs";
L250: import { spawn, execSync } from "child_process";
L251: import path from "path";
L252: import os from "os";
L253: var homedir = os.homedir;
L254: function exeDir() {
...
L266: try {
L267: const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path.join(pkgRoot, "package.json"), "utf8"));
L268: return pkg.version;
...
L287: versionMismatchWarned = true;
L288: process.stderr.write(
L289: `exe-os: daemon/client version mismatch (daemon ${daemonVersion}, client ${clientVersion}). Run: exe-os-install --global
```

### 20. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/update.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/update.js>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L150: try {
L151: execSync(`npm install -g @askexenow/exe-os@${manifest.version}`, {
L152: stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "inherit"],
```

### 21. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 22. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 23. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/exe-start.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/exe-start.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = dist/bin/exe-start.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 10931
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 24. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 25. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 26. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** deploy/compose/generate-env.ts\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/deploy/compose/generate-env.ts%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 7
```

### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/install.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/install.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/bin/install.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/chunk-PPMGQFLJ.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/chunk-PPMGQFLJ.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/chunk-PPMGQFLJ.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/chunk-XN5AN3JP.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/chunk-XN5AN3JP.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/chunk-6COYVPMU.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 30. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/cli.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/bin/cli.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 31. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/codex-reviewd-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/codex-reviewd-cli.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/bin/codex-reviewd-cli.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 32. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/exe-agent.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/exe-agent.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/bin/exe-agent.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 33. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/exe-launch-agent.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/exe-launch-agent.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/bin/exe-launch-agent.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 34. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/exe-rename.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/exe-rename.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/bin/exe-rename.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 35. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/exe-start-codex.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/exe-start-codex.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/bin/exe-start-codex.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 36. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/update.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/bin/update.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/bin/update.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 37. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/chunk-5V7BD7Z4.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/chunk-5V7BD7Z4.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/chunk-5V7BD7Z4.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 38. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/chunk-EQWKSGBY.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@askexenow/exe-os@0.9.381/dist/chunk-EQWKSGBY.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @askexenow/exe-os@0.9.380
matchedPath = dist/chunk-BQZE2CVE.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGFza2V4ZW5vdy9leGUtb3M:0.9.380
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 25
- **Optional dependencies:** 2
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 14
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 27

### Published dependency entries
- @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.95.2 (Dependency)
- @aws-sdk/client-s3 ^3.1052.0 (Dependency)
- @aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner ^3.1052.0 (Dependency)
- @libsql/client ^0.14.0 (Dependency)
- @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0 (Dependency)
- @opentelemetry/api ^1.9.1 (Dependency)
- @opentelemetry/sdk-node ^0.219.0 (Dependency)
- @opentelemetry/sdk-trace-base ^2.8.0 (Dependency)
- @slack/bolt ^4.7.0 (Dependency)
- @slack/web-api ^7.15.1 (Dependency)
- bip39 ^3.1.0 (Dependency)
- discord.js ^14.26.3 (Dependency)
- grammy ^1.42.0 (Dependency)
- ink ^6.8.0 (Dependency)
- ink-text-input ^6.0.0 (Dependency)
- jose ^6.2.2 (Dependency)
- node-llama-cpp ^3.18.1 (Dependency)
- nodemailer ^8.0.9 (Dependency)
- openai ^6.33.0 (Dependency)
- pg ^8.20.0 (Dependency)
- react ^19.2.4 (Dependency)
- typescript ^5.9.3 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.21.0 (Dependency)
- yjs ^13.6.30 (Dependency)
- zod ^4.3.6 (Dependency)
- @whiskeysockets/baileys ^7.0.0-rc12 (OptionalDependency)
- keytar ^7.9.0 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @askexenow/exe-os
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.9.381
- **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE
- **Version published:** 2026-09-08T02:25:27.860Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T10:17:21.528Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-03T11:59:39.068Z
- **Known versions:** 41
- **Latest version:** 0.9.410
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** AI employee operating system — persistent memory, task management, and multi-agent coordination for Claude Code.
- **Keywords:** claude-code, claude, mcp, memory, ai-agents, multi-agent, embeddings, vector-search, libsql, turso, rag
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 780
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 8,610,506 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@askexenow/exe-os/v/0.9.381>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/AskExe/exe-os.git>)
- [Homepage](<https://askexe.com/>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/AskExe/exe-os/issues>)